Administrative Substance by Sunstein, Cass Robert
 
Administrative Substance
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly
available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your
story matters.
Citation Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991
Duke L. J. 607 (1991).
Published
Version
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol40/iss3/2/
Accessed February 16, 2015 1:59:35 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12809460
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard
University's DASH repository, and is made available
under the terms and conditions applicable to Other
Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAADMINISTRATIVE  SUBSTANCE
CASS  R. SUNSTEIN*
I.  Introduction ..............................................  607
II.  Regulatory  Rationales .....................................  611
A.  Notes on First  Principles ..............................  611
1.  Liberal Republicanism ............................  612
2.  The New Deal Reformation .......................  616
B.  (Some of) The Limits of Markets .....................  618
III.  Regulatory  Successes  and Failures .........................  622
A.  Successes .............................................  622
B.  Failures ..............................................  625
C.  The Sources of Failure ................................  627
IV.  Regulating  With Incentives ................................  631
A.  General  Lessons ......................................  631
B.  Particulars ...........................................  634
1.  Market-Based Incentives in the Environmental
A rea .............................................  634
a.  Emissions trading  programs ....................  634
b.  Taxation ......................................  637
c.  Deposits .......................................  639
2.  Market-Based Incentives for Occupational  Safety
and H ealth .......................................  640
3.  Market-Based Incentives in Other  Areas ............  641
V.  Lessons for the Judiciary ..................................  642
VI.  Conclusion  ...............................................  644
I.  INTRODUCTION
For the last generation,  work in  administrative  law  has generally
followed the path marked out by Kenneth Culp Davis'  and Louis Jaffe.2
Judicial  review of administrative action  has been the principal  focus  of
*  Karl  N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University  of Chicago Law School; Profes-
sor of Political Science, University of Chicago.  Some of the arguments in this Article also appear, in
different form, in C. SUNSTEIN,  AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:  RECONCEIVING THE REGULA-
TORY  STATE (1990).
1.  See K.  DAVIS,  ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW  TREATISE (1958).
2.  See  L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL  OF ADMINISTRATIVE  ACTION  (1965).DUKE LAW JOURNAL
the subject,3 and the control of administrative discretion  is its principal
goal.4  The central concern of this scholarship has been the development,
through judge-made law, of procedural rules to discipline the exercise of
power by bureaucrats.
These topics are of course extremely important.  One cannot obtain
a complete understanding of the American administrative state without
an appreciation  of the actual and potential  contributions  of judicial  re-
view.  For too long, however, those who study and teach the subject have
been unduly preoccupied  with the role of the courts and with the ques-
tion  of administrative  procedure.  More  than  a  half-century  after  the
New  Deal, the legal  culture continues  to lack a  solid understanding  of
the  substantive  purposes  of  regulatory  programs,  the  pathologies  to
which  these  programs  are  subject,  the  forces  that  bring  about  those
pathologies,  and the consequences  of regulation for the real world.
The point is  confirmed by the fact that many views  on regulation
tend to operate as articles of faith.  Some have a general sense that regu-
lation has failed;  others have a general sense that markets are inadequate
and that regulatory controls are usually the solution.5  But the particu-
lars of regulatory  performance  over the last  generation-the  questions
about underlying values and commitments, questions aimed at discerning
what works  and what does not-have yet to become  a standard part of
the repertoire of those who teach  and practice administrative law.
A study of these aspects of governance should be a principal goal of
administrative law in the future.  Such a study would generate facts and
ideas of primary interest to legislators and administrators-the  principal
architects of administrative  law.  Of course, it would be surprising if an
understanding  of regulatory  goals  and performance  did not  ultimately
affect the practice of judicial review.  The effect on the judiciary should,
however, be a secondary concern in light of the inevitably derivative and
3.  There  are prominent  exceptions.  See, eg.,  S.  BREYER,  REGULATION  AND  ITS  REFORM
(1982)  (constructing a framework  for the analysis, evaluation,  and development of regulatory  pro-
grams);  Rose-Ackerman,  Progressive Law and Economics-And the New  Administrative Law, 98
YALE  L.J. 341 (1988)  (urging broader perspective based on political science and economics).  Chris-
topher Edley's  recent book  helpfully  focuses  on  the question  of improved  regulation  rather than
control  of discretion; but it too  is perhaps unduly preoccupied  with the judiciary.  See C.  EDLEY,
ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW:  RETHINKING  JUDICIAL  CONTROL  OF BUREAUCRACY  (1990).
4.  A classic work in political science also focuses on control  of administrative discretion.  See
T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979).  It is not at all clear, however, that administrative
agencies  perform  better  when their administrators are  deprived  of discretion;  the absence  of solid
evidence  to this effect  makes the  preoccupation with discretion particularly  puzzling.
5.  In an important sense, this dichotomy is extremely misleading.  Markets themselves depend
on  legal  rules  for their  existence,  and those  rules  are inevitably  regulatory.  I use  these  terms  to
conform  to common  usage.
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partial (which is not to say unimportant) role of the courts in administra-
tive law.
6
I approach some of these questions by exploring the general problem
of so-called "social"  regulation, principally in the areas of health, safety,
broadcasting, discrimination,  and the environment.7  The purpose of the
discussion is to shift the focus away from procedure and instead to obtain
a preliminary sense of administrative substance-an area in which, I sug-
gest, we should predict large eventual gains in the study of administrative
law.  I propose a shift not  only from procedure  to substance,8  but also
from courts  to legislators  and  administrators  as the major audience  of
legal work on administration.  I also set forth some general principles by
which  to  operate  regulatory systems  to control  pollution, occupational
risk,  discrimination,  and  insufficient  quality  and  diversity  in
broadcasting.9
In the last decade, it has become fashionable to decry the regulatory
system that has grown up in response  to the consumer, labor, anti-dis-
crimination,  and  environmental  movements  of the  1930s,  1960s,  and
1970s.  Under one quite prominent view,  government regulation in these
areas is often indefensible in principle-because it amounts to unjustified
paternalism  or public  meddling  in  private affairs-and  is,  in any  case,
intolerable in practice because it predictably  makes things worse rather
than better. 10
But this view is myopic.  A number of solid arguments justify regu-
lation, and those arguments are not paternalistic  at all."  Moreover, so-
cial regulation has not always failed:  it has protected endangered species,
6.  See infra notes  137-50 and accompanying  text.
7.  I do not discuss economic  regulation, which raises  a distinctive set of concerns.
8.  The effort  to move the study of administrative  law in this direction is not an entirely new
theme.  See, e.g.,  S. BREYER  & R.  STEWART,  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND  REGULATORY  POLICY 9-
10  (2d  ed.  1985)  ("We have  selected  a range  of examples  designed  to introduce  students  to the
substance of 'economic regulation'. ..  because such examples often will illustrate the interaction  of
'substance' and 'procedure'  that lead a court or an agency to reach a particular result."); S. BREYER,
supra note 3, at 341-68  (discussing regulatory substance); J. MASHAW  & D.  HARFST, THE  STRUG-
GLE FOR AUTO  SAFETY (1990)  (analyzing history of auto regulation); G. ROBINSON,  E. GELLHORN
& H. BRUFF,  THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  PROCESS  3-4 (3d  ed.  1986)  (calling  for study  of substantive
regulatory  law).
9.  See infra notes  98-136 and accompanying  text.
10.  See R. EPSTEIN,  TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY  AND  THE POWER OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN
(1985)  (challenging post-New  Deal  regulation);  Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regula-
tion, in CHICAGO  STUDIES  IN  POLITICAL  ECONOMY  279  (G. Stigler ed.  1988) (assessing the effects
and aggregate social costs of intervention  and public regulation);  Williams, Background Norms in the
Regulatory State, 58 U. CHI.  L. REV.  419,  427-30 (1991)  (critically discussing favorable assessment
of government intervention).
11.  The term "paternalism"  may itself be misleading.  See Sunstein, Preferences and  Politics, 20
PHIL. &  PUB.  AFF.  3  (1991).
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reduced  discrimination,  helped  clean  up  the air and  water,  and  saved
many thousands of lives.
12  To be sure, there have been failures, some of
them extremely serious.
13  But the failures  come in identifiable  patterns,
and  they  can be  avoided  in  the future.  The  lessons  derived  from  the'
failures should point regulators in new directions-not toward an exclu-
sive reliance  on private markets  or toward  enthusiasm  for laissez-faire,
but rather toward  strategies  that  will incorporate  an  understanding  of
market forces, promote the democratic character of modern government,
and increase international competitiveness while minimizing undesirable
side-effects and reducing regulatory costs.
This Article proceeds  in  four stages.  Part II outlines  some  of the
arguments  in  support of an  aggressive regulatory  state  in the  areas  of
health,  safety,  civil rights,  broadcasting, and  environmental  protection.
These arguments draw on some of the principles that are associated not
only with the New Deal, but also with the liberal republicanism that has
characterized  American public law since its inception.
Part III describes some of the successes and failures of social regula-
tion, with special emphasis on the reasons for failure.  My goals are both
to debunk the myth of regulatory failure and to show that the programs
that have performed poorly have done so along predictable lines, princi-
pally because of the incentives they have created and because of the ways
in which they have compromised both democratic and economic goals.
Part IV  outlines  new  regulatory  strategies by which  we might in-
crease  decentralization, respect for private autonomy,  cost-effectiveness,
and flexibility in social regulation.  Through this discussion, I seek above
all to demonstrate  that the goals of economic efficiency  and of a well-
functioning democracy can be entirely compatible, indeed mutually rein-
forcing, across a broad spectrum of regulatory programs.  Disclosure and
information-producing  strategies-strongly  favored  on  economic
grounds-also promote the democratic goals of accountability  and polit-
ical self-determination.  Economic incentives  diminish the power of spe-
cial  interests  and  ensure  that  the  democratic  process  focuses  on  the
central question-how  much regulation  at what  cost.  Decentralization
promotes  democratic  goals  in both  private  and  public  spheres.  These
ideas  can be profitably  applied  to the regulation  of labor, the environ-
ment, and the broadcasting industry.
Part V briefly describes how an understanding of regulatory aspira-
tion and regulatory performance might affect judicial review.  In this dis-
cussion, I set forth principles of statutory interpretation that may be used
12.  See infra notes  62-76 and accompanying text.
13.  See infra notes 77-84  and accompanying  text.
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by courts to reinforce the virtues and minimize the vices of the regulatory
state.
II.  REGULATORY  RATIONALES
A.  Notes on First  Principles
Administrative  law is peculiarly  concerned with the distribution of
social  benefits  and burdens  in  such  important areas  as  social  security,
taxation, the environment, occupational safety and health, employment,
nuclear power, energy, and national  defense.  Large substantive  debates
will  inevitably  lurk  behind  even  apparently  mundane  doctrinal
controversies.
For this reason, any approach to administrative law ultimately rests
on quite general  substantive  choices.  Consider, for example,  the claim
for  a  presumption  against judicial  review  of administrative  inaction.14
Often  this  claim  is  defended  by  reference  to  purely  institutional  con-
cerns.15  In fact, however, the presumption against judicial review of ad-
ministrative  action stems  in  large part  from a  substantive (and  highly
contested) view that courts should more seriously scrutinize "regulation"
than  "failure  to regulate."' 1  This  view  implies  that courts  should  be
more hospitable to an agency's  refusal to implement  congressional  pro-
grams than to its zealousness  in the enforcement process.
Because  administrative law inevitably  involves  substantive  choices,
the following discussion will depend on some controversial  claims about
the foundations of American administrative law.  I cannot defend these
claims  at any  length.  Instead,  I propose  to explain  what they  are,  to
provide a sense of their historical roots, and to show how they draw from
a wide range of ideas that might seem contradictory  at first glance.  The
two foundations with which I am concerned are, first, the liberal republi-
canism that has  characterized  American public  law  since the founding
period, and, second, the New Deal reformation  of the constitutional sys-
14.  See, t.g.,  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,  825-28, 837-38  (1985) (holding that a Food and
Drug Administration's decision not to take requested enforcement action was not subject to judicial
review).
15.  See Williams,  The Roots of  Deference (Book Review),  100 YALE L.J.  1103  (1991)  (review-
ing  C.  EDLEY,  ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW:  RETHINKING  JUDICIAL  CONTROL  OF  BUREAUCRACY
(1990)) (arguing that the institutional features of federal courts compel judicial deference on issues of
resource allocation).
16.  The quotation marks are necessary because regulation is in fact always present, in the form
of the common law of property, contract, and tort. The failure of a federal regulatory agency to take
action does  not leave things to the play of free or voluntary forces, but instead gives rise to another
(perhaps more just and efficient) regulatory system.  This was  a prominent theme in the New Deal
era.
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tem, which played such a major role in the inauguration of the adminis-
trative state as we know it. 17
1.  Liberal Republicanism.  Liberal  republicanism  embodies  sev-
eral commitments  that are designed  to be "important  in  the world."' 8
Predictably,  then,  reformers  in  areas  as  diverse  as  labor,  the environ-
ment, electoral representation,  political restructuring, broadcasting,  and
antidiscrimination law have long invoked the commitments of liberal re-
publicanism in making concrete  suggestions for change.
Among the principles  of liberal  republicanism,  the most important
is the belief in political deliberation. 19  In American public law, political
outcomes should  not merely  reflect the aggregated  self-interest of well-
organized groups, nor should they protect only antecedent or prepolitical
private rights.20  Instead,  political  outcomes should  be produced  by  an
extended  process of deliberation and discussion, in which new informa-
tion and new perspectives  are brought to bear.
17.  In setting forth the principles of liberal republicanism,  I largely summarize the discussion in
Sunstein,  Beyond the Republican Revival, 97  YALE L.J.  1539,  1547-58  (1988).  In  this discussion,
liberalism refers to an approach to politics that emphasizes  individual freedom  and democratic self-
government, rather than to the consensus  among self-styled "liberals"  from 1960 to the present.  In
the same  vein, republicanism  refers to a theory of politics that values  collective self-determination,
political  equality, and deliberation,  rather than to the views of self-styled  "republicans"  of the last
generation.
In the American context, liberalism and republicanism cannot be sharply distinguished.  Efforts
to oppose them transform  each position  into something  that reasonable  people would find  hard to
defend-making  liberalism, for  example, into a commitment to unbridled interest-group pluralism,
and republicanism  into a wholesale rejection  of rights.
18. Edley,  The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political  Ideology,  1991  DUKE L.J.  561,
594.  Professor Edley expresses concern that the "republican revival ...  seems trapped in a familiar
legal  liberalism ....  [lit has not come  to us as part of a powerful critique of anything important  in
the world."  Id.  Insofar as republicanism is, broadly speaking, "at one" with the liberalism of Mill,
Dewey, and Rawls, and insofar as "legal liberalism"  (a most ambiguous  idea) can be understood as
part of that form of liberalism, he seems entirely correct in recognizing  a connection between  repub-
licanism and legal liberalism.  (Of course, adherents to liberal republicanism  would quibble with the
word  "trapped.")  Liberal  republicanism  does,  however, straightforwardly  attack  three  ideas:  (1)
interest-group  pluralism;  (2)  conceptions  of prepolitical  or presocial  rights as  the  centerpiece  of
American  public law; and (3)  assumptions that existing distributions  of resources, entitlements, and
even preferences are neutral  or just.  See Sunstein, supra note 17,  at 1547-58.  To this extent, liberal
republicanism is indeed  a challenge  to many things that are important "in  the world."
19.  Madison  emphasizes this theme throughout his work, most famously in THE FEDERALIST
No. 10 (J. Madison).
20.  Of course, an enthusiastic belief in private property  does lie at the heart of republicanism.
See, eg., J. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN  MOMENT 462-64  (1975).  A liberal  republican  would
emphasize  that private  property  is  a creation  of legal  rules, rather  than  a  prepolitical  right;  but
liberal republicanism certainly does not, for this reason, disparage the institution of private property.
The traditional liberal strand values private property for its connection with liberty and prosperity.
The  traditional  republican  strand views private property  as an  indispensable  guarantee of security
and independence  from the state.  In this  sense, private property is  a precondition  for  citizenship,
because it protects people  from dependence  on the will of the sovereign.ADMINISTRATIVE  SUBSTANCE
Under  this view,  the political  process  should  strive to coordinate
and reasonably accommodate  different values and preferences.  But pref-
erences are not taken as prepolitical  or static.  They are a subject of con-
versation  and  debate-as  people  decide,  in politics,  about  appropriate
approaches  toward contemporary problems, such as environmental  deg-
radation,  broadcasting  policy,  labor-management  relations,  and  racial
and sexual discrimination.
21
Three additional commitments follow from this view of political de-
liberation.  First, liberal republicanism prizes citizenship.  It does not re-
quire that all decisions be made by town meeting,22 but it does not view
political participation as dispensable  in a well-functioning  democracy.23
Liberal republicans seek to ensure that the political process benefits from
widespread participation by the citizenry.24  A system without such par-
ticipation is, to that extent, a failure.
Second, liberal republicanism is committed to universalism-  agree-
ment as a regulatory ideal for politics.  Liberal republicans thus reject the
view that political  differences  are merely  matters  of perspective,  situa-
tion, or taste.25  On the contrary, they believe that right answers to polit-
ical  controversy  can frequently  be identified.  Right  answers  appear  as
such through the ultimate criterion of agreement, reached by the citizens
under appropriate  conditions.26
The final  commitment  is to political  equality, and  here things are
more  complex.  At a  minimum,  the commitment  to  political  equality
prohibits  large  disparities  in  the  political  influence  of  different  social
groups.27  Actual  or virtual  disenfranchisement  of citizens  is  therefore
banned.  A guarantee  of political  equality  does not,  however, translate
into a guarantee of economic equality.  Indeed, the political creed of eco-
21.  See Manin, On Legitimacy and  Political  Deliberation,  15  POL. THEORY 338,  340-41 (1987)
(discussing the universalist theory of justice that represents the interests of all members of society by
requiring unanimity  only for the "larger principles"  and not for  each individual decision).
22.  Madison rejected classical republicanism on this ground.  See THE FEDERALIST No.  10., at
21-22 (J. Madison)  (R. Fairfield 2d ed.  1966).
23.  See  THE FEDERALIST No. 39,  at  191  (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield 2d ed.  1966).
24.  Constitutions-which the citizenry  itself establishes-may of course limit citizen  decision-
making.  See Ackerman,  Constitutional  Politics/Constitutional  Law, 99 YALE  L.J. 453 (1989)  (deci-
sionmaking  by  citizens  requires  a serious  and  focused  political  movement  that  can  convince  a
majority of fellow citizens of the merits of the proposal, while also giving the opposition the opportu-
nity to launch  its own campaign).
25.  See Meyers, Beyond the Sum of the Interests, in THE  MIND  OF THE  FOUNDER  xxiv-xxxiii
(M.  Meyers rev.  ed.  1981).
26.  In some  cases,  genuine  consensus  is  impossible  to achieve.  The  basic point  is  that this
highly pragmatic concept of agreement constitutes the only criterion for truth.  See Dewey, Proposi-
tions, Warranted  Assertability, and Truth, 38 J. PHIL. 265  (1941).
27.  See  Sunstein, supra note  17,  at 1552-53.
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nomic egalitarianism 28 is foreign to the liberal republicanism  of Ameri-
can public law.  The American tradition rejects egalitarianism because it
conflicts  with three principal goals of liberal republicanism:  promoting
liberty; providing incentives for productive work; and rewarding and rec-
ognizing  individual  achievement  and excellence.  Insofar  as  regulatory
and welfare programs  are founded upon egalitarian principles  (and they
rarely  are),  they are  indeed inconsistent  with the liberal  republicanism
that undergirds American  public law.
At the same time, three narrower conceptions of equality do play an
important role in the American  administrative  state.29  These narrower
conceptions, sometimes identified with egalitarianism, spring in fact from
quite different foundations.
The first is a belief in freedom from desperate conditions.30  No one
should be deprived of adequate food, shelter, police protection, or medi-
cal  care.  This principle  allows  for enormous  variations  in  living  stan-
dards; it can hardly be classified as egalitarian.  It does, however, protect
people from falling below a specified floor.
The  second  conception  is  an  opposition  to  caste  systems.  The
American  tradition  has  also  traditionally  disfavored  such  systems.31
Even so, some current arrangements  (including the social and legal treat-
ment of blacks, women, and the handicapped32) continue to retain caste-
28.  I understand the term "egalitarianism"  to connote an effort  to ensure against large dispari-
ties in wealth and resources.
29.  I  do not claim that the Constitution compels any of these principles.  Although some con-
stitutional  provisions  reflect  ideas that are consistent with these principles (most notably  the thir-
teenth, fourteenth,  fifteenth,  and nineteenth  amendments),  none of these narrower conceptions  of
political  equality  can claim an unambiguous constitutional  home.
30.  Madison and Jefferson both defended the right to a minimum quality of life.  See Sunstein,
supra note  17, at  1553 n.75.  Roosevelt also endorsed this principle in his Second Bill of Rights.  He
noted  various "economic truths [that]  have become accepted  as self-evident....  Among these are:
The right to a useful  and remunerative job...; The right to earn  enough to provide adequate food
and clothing and recreation; ...  The right of every family to a decent home; The right to adequate
medical care...; [and] The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness,
accident, and unemployment; .... " Roosevelt, Message to the Congress  on the State of the Union, in
13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND  ADDRESSES  OF FRANKLIN  D. ROOSEVELT 41 (1969)  (speech delivered
Jan.  11,  1944).
31.  See L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION  IN AMERICA 3-32  (1955).  Although the Ameri-
can tradition disfavors caste systems, it has not recognized and disapproved of every caste system as
such.  The two most prominent examples-the  enslavement of black people and the disenfranchise-
ment of women-reveal that  general principles,  even if widely held,  can be selectively  applied.
32.  Along nearly every important dimension of social welfare, blacks are worse off than whites
and women worse off than men.  See STATISTICAL  ABSTRACT  OF THE UNITED  STATES  420, 445-62
(110th ed.  1990).  In addition,  persons who are handicapped  continue to face obvious barriers in a
world designed by  and for the able-bodied.
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like features.33  Modem  administrative  regimes  seek  to eliminate or to
counteract these caste-like systems.
Finally,  liberal  republicanism  seeks  to  assure  its  citizens  rough
equality of opportunity.34  Having  rejected the egalitarian  principle, lib-
eral republicans nonetheless insist that the life prospects of a child born
to one family in one part of the country ought not to be radically  differ-
ent from those of another child born to another family elsewhere.  It is
true  that in  a  liberal  society,  different  families  will  have  different  re-
sources,  backgrounds,  and  educations,  and -these differences  constrain
our ability to guarantee equal opportunity.  Nonetheless, government can
do much to help.  It can ensure that education is available  to all.  It can
design regulatory systems that promote awareness and understanding of
public  issues.  It can  create  training and  other  programs  to  give  solid
prospects to people born in average or below-average conditions.  And it
can minimize the risk that economic differences  will translate into large
disparities in the life chances  of its citizens.  Ideas of precisely this sort
form the basis for a number of regulatory programs.35
The  commitments of liberal republicanism  to deliberation,  citizen-
ship, universalism, and political equality draw from a wide range of start-
ing  points;  this  is  no  sectarian  creed.  The  liberalism  of Mill 36  and
Rawls37  is entirely  compatible with the account I have  offered.  Taken
seriously,38  it calls for large-scale changes in existing arrangements.  In
addition, certain forms of utilitarianism  place a high premium  on polit-
ical deliberation, prize political equality, and do not take existing prefer-
33.  On caste and  inequality, see Sunstein,  Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79  CAL.  L. REv.  751
(1991).
34.  See 3. RAWLS,  A THEORY  OF JUSTICE 73  (1971).
35.  For  example,  consider  education,  environment,  occupation,  employment,  and  training
programs.
36.  See  J. MILL,  CONSIDERATIONS  ON  REPRESENTATIVE  GOVERNMENT  (3d  ed.  1865);  J.
MILL,  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY,  WITH  SOME  OF  THEIR  APPLICATIONS  TO  SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY  (1880)  [hereinafter  J.  MILL,  POLITICAL  ECONOMY];  J. MILL,  THE  SUBJECTION  OF
WOMEN  (2d ed.  1869).
37.  See generally J. RAwLs,  supra note 34, at 195-257 (discussing a "basic structure"  designed
for a constitutional  democracy, and required to satisfy principles of justice, including the difference
principle).
38.  In law and elsewhere, critics have frequently  caricatured the liberal tradition in three ways:
(1) as a wholehearted endorsement of interest-group pluralism; (2) as a belief that government exists
solely to protect predefined private rights; or (3)  as a principle of neutrality rooted in the preserva-
tion of the status quo.  See M. KELMAN,  A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL  STUDIES (1987)  (treating
liberalism  as committed  to pre-political  rights);  C. MACKINNON,  FEMINISM  UNMODIFIED:  DIS-
COURSES  ON LIFE AND LAW (1987)  (describing liberalism as rooted in an indefensible conception of
neutrality).  No important liberal ever subscribed to any of these ideas.  See S. HOLMES,  THE ANAT-
OMY  OF ANTILIBERALISM  (forthcoming  1992) (discussing various mistakes of antiliberals).
Vol.  1991:607]DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  1991:607
ences and distributions  as the basis for social choice.39  Thus understood,
utilitarianism is fully compatible with the account  suggested here.  Lib-
eral republicanism  is also closely linked to certain forms of pragmatism.
For example,  John Dewey  emphasized  a conception  of liberty  founded
on establishing the social preconditions  necessary  for political delibera-
tion and free preference  formation.40  Finally, the contemporary revival
of Aristotelianism leads quite naturally to the four  commitments that I
have identified.  This is  so  especially  insofar  as the Aristotelian revival
derives  from a perceived need to create social institutions that allow de-
velopment of the capabilities of all citizens.41  The fact that liberal repub-
licanism  can draw  from  such a variety  of traditions surely  adds  to its
general appeal.42
2.  The New Deal Reformation.  An  understanding  of American
administrative law cannot be obtained through a study of liberal republi-
canism alone.  It is also necessary to explore the New Deal reformation
of the constitutional  framework.43  For purposes  of the present discus-
sion, the central aspect of the New Deal reformation was its attack on the
system of laissez-faire.
For New Deal reformers,  the very idea of laissez-faire was miscon-
ceived.44  It diverted attention from the fact that legal rules were already
39.  See, eg.,  R. BRANDT, A  THEORY  OF THE RIGHT  AND  THE  GOOD  (1979)  (discussing a
framework for utilitarianism that does not rest on existing preferences); J. RILEY, LIBERAL  UTILI-
TARIANISM:  SOCIAL  CHOICE THEORY  AND J.S.  MILL'S PHILOSOPHY  (1988)  (same).
40.  See, e.g.,  J. DEWEY,  FREEDOM  AND  CULTURE  18-19 (1939)  ("[A] certain complex  culture
stimulates, promotes and consolidates native tendencies  so as to produce a certain pattern of desires
and  purposes.");  id. at  140  ("The assumption  that  desires are  rigidly  fixed  is not one  on  its  face
consistent with the history of man's progress from savagery  through barbarism to even the present
defective  state of civilization.");  Dewey,  Philosophies of Freedom, in FREEDOM  IN THE  MODERN
WORLD 236,  243 (H. Kallen ed.  1928) ("[Wle may say that a stone has its preferential selections set
by a relatively fixed,  a rigidly  set, structure....  The reverse is true of human action.  In so far as a
variable  life-history and intelligent insight and foresight enter into it,  choice signifies  a capacity for
deliberately changing preferences.");  Dewey, The Future of  Liberalism, in DEWEY AND His CRITICS
695, 697 (S.  Morgenesser ed.  1977) ("Liberalism  knows that social conditions may restrict, distort,
and almost  prevent the  development  of individuality.  It  therefore  takes an  active interest  in  the
working of social institutions that have a bearing,  positive or negative, upon the growth of individu-
als.... It  is as much  interested in the positive construction of favorable institutions, legal, political,
and economic, as  it is in  the work of removing abuses and  overt oppressions.").
41.  See A.  SEN,  COMMODITIES  AND  CAPABILITIES  (1985);  Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social De-
mocracy, in  LIBERALISM  AND THE  GOOD  203 (N.  Douglas,  G. Mara  & H. Richardson  eds.  1990).
42.  Cf Rawls,  The Idea of An  Overlapping Consensus, 7  OXFORD  J. LEGAL STUD.  1 (1987)
(discussing capacity of the Rawlsian  view of liberalism to draw from range of starting points),
43.  For a more extended discussion,  see C. SUNSTEIN,  supra note *,  at 193,  210-26; Sunstein,
Constitutionalism  After the New Deal, 101  HARV.  L. REV.  421,  425-30, 508-10 (1987).
44.  Consider Roosevelt's suggestion:  "We must lay hold of the fact that economic laws are not
made  by  nature.  They  are  made  by  human  beings."  1  PUBLIC  PAPERS  OF  FRANKLIN  D.
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in place, that they did not leave matters alone, and on the contrary  that
they created a system that sometimes produced both inefficiency  and in-
justice.  Far from laissez-faire, the market was constructed by the rules of
contract,  tort, and property law, and these  operated  as regulatory con-
trols,  benefiting  some  people  while burdening  others.  The  system that
preceded the New Deal could not be characterized as "natural"  or "pre-
political."  It represented a series of social choices  embodied in law.
These propositions did not by themselves justify the rise of the regu-
latory state.  Indeed, the assertion that a system is socially constructed is
entirely neutral from the moral point of view-such an assertion does not
support change.  But the New Dealers also claimed that new regulatory
regimes  could  both  promote  prosperity  and  help  the disadvantaged.45
These claims largely undergirded the creation of the modem administra-
tive state; they provide much of the focus of contemporary controversy in
administrative law.
In many respects, the ideas of the New Deal reformation  are highly
compatible  with liberal republicanism.  The  major difference  lies in the
emphatic  New  Deal  insistence  that existing  distributions  of resources
must not be taken as natural or just, but assessed on pragmatic grounds,
exploring  their  consequences  for  economic  prosperity  and  distributive
justice.46 The modem regulatory system has grown out of this insistence,
and the pragmatic assessment of regulatory programs was hardly meant
to end in the  1930s.47
45.  Many New Deal reforms have of course failed.  For example, the effort to ensure carteliza-
tion, prominent in the early New Deal, was notoriously unsuccessful  on pragmatic grounds.  See E.
HAWLEY,  THE NEW  DEAL AND  THE PROBLEM  OF MONOPOLY (1966).
46.  See  K. DAVIS,  FDR:  THE  NEW  DEAL  YEARS  1933-1937,  at  232-37  (1986)  (discussing
pragmatism and willingness to experiment).
47.  The  New Deal  emphasis on the constructed  character of the social framework  was prag-
matic and liberal,  not "postliberal"  or "postmodem."  The reforms that have followed,  or will fol-
low, have  not and need  not take postmodern  form.  Although I agree  with much  of Christopher
Edley's contribution to this symposium, my uneasiness with some of it stems from his enthusiasm for
postmodernism in law.  In this discussion, I restrict myself to some brief observations on this com-
plex  issue.  For a more  extended  discussion,  see M.  NUSSBAUM,  Sophistry About Conventions, in
LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE  220  (1990).
First, in order to be worth holding, any position on law and politics must be justified by refer-
ence to reasons.  We should not restrict ourselves to a narrow or strictly Cartesian category of "rea-
sons,"  but  a  view  unsupported  by  reasons  is  unlikely  to  deserve  serious  consideration.  The
postmodern  position, however, appears  to reject the process  of reason-giving  altogether,  referring
instead to "play,"  "conventions,"  or "power."  See, eg., J. DERRIDA,  OF GRAMMATOLOGY  50  (G.
Spivak trans.  1976) (play); S. FISH,  DOING WHAT  COMES NATURALLY:  CHANGE,  RHETORIC, AND
THE  PRACTICE  OF  THEORY  IN LITERARY  AND  LEGAL  STUDIES  (1989)  (conventions);  M.  Fou-
CAULT,  POWER/KNOWLEDGE:  SELECTED  INTERVIEWS  AND  OTHER  WRITINGS,  1972-1977  (C.
Gordon ed.  1981)  (power).  In  law and politics,  this substitution ensures  that postmodernists "can
give no account of the normative foundations of [their] own rhetoric."  J. HABERMAS,  THE PHILO-
SOPHICAL  DISCOURSE  OF MODERNITY:  TWELVE  LECTURES 294 (F. Lawrence trans.  1986).
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B.  (Some of) The Limits of Markets
No industrialized  democracy  does or could  operate without  a sub-
stantial  regulatory  state.  To be sure,  private markets  usually  promote
Second, a healthy recognition of the constructed or contingent character of most of the social
world  points  in no particular  direction.  In its logic, it need  hardly be  allied  with desirable social
movements.  In its logic, it points nowhere  at all.
Third, the fact that there is no wholly external point of view-no place, outside the world, from
which to view the world-does  not lead to the conclusion  that we are left in an abyss  or with the
endless  free  play of conflicting  perspectives.  See M.  NUSSBAUM,  supra,  at 225-27.  Instead,  the
absence  of a wholly  external  perspective  means simply that participants  in law  and politics  must
discuss what they always have:  the effects of different systems on the lives of human beings who are
affected  by law and  politics.  As long as metaphysics do not intrude, truth and objectivity  are not
dispensable  concepts in this endeavor.
Fourth,  stability  is not  intrinsically bad,  and  fluidity  is not  intrinsically  good.  The value  of
change depends on the particular subject of change.  To the extent that postmodernism prizes fluid-
ity and transformation, independently of substance, it will often point in the wrong direction.  See R.
UNGER,  FALSE NEcEssrr  (1987)  (praising  "context smashing").
Fifth, the postmodern approach  relies too heavily on  abstract claims of contingency  and con-
structedness, and focuses too little on developing specific substantive remedies for injustice and ineffi-
ciency in  existing systems.  See, eg.,  Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form,  139 U. PA.  L.
REv.  801  (1991).  For example,  the relationship  between postmodernism  and contemporary racial
inequality is quite obscure.  How the former can help us understand or remedy the latter remains to
be explained.
Sixth, the postmodern approach tends, wrongly, to disparage instrumental rationality, which is
critically important in bringing about effective change in the real world.  Problems such as homeless-
ness and discrimination require,  for their solution, efforts  grounded in instrumental reason.
Seventh, postmodernism attempts to consolidate two positions that are actually quite incompat-
ible.  The first position,  rooted in Heidegger  and reflected  in Derrida, attacks Western  thought for
positing  a reality below  "surface"  appearances.  See J.  DERRIDA,  supra.  According  to this view,
below  the surface  appearances lie simply more surfaces.  The second  position, rooted  in Marx and
having  clear echoes  in Foucault,  attempts to "unmask"  thought and practices that conceal  oppres-
sion, injustice, or the exercise of power.  See M. FOUCAULT,  DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:  THE BIRTH
OF THE  PRISON (A. Sheridan trans.  1977).  The task of unmasking necessarily implies the unveiling
of a deeper truth or reality.  The rejection  of any  underlying  "reality"  (a profoundly antipolitical
view)  does not allow for the notions of exposure or unmasking.  Together, these two positions pro-
duce  a range  of confusions.  See Schlag,  "Le Hors de Texte,  C'est No:"  The Politics of Form,  I1
CARDOZO  L. REv.  1631  (1990).
Finally, the postmodern  approach depends  on a critique of metaphysical realism that has been
put forth more persuasively, and with more careful  attention  to its implications,  by Dewey,  James,
Putnam,  and Wittgenstein, among others.  See J. DEWEY,  EXPERIENCE  AND  NATURE  (1926);  W.
JAMES,  PRAGMATISM:  A  NEw NAME  FOR  SOME  OLD  WAYS  OF THINKING (1928);  H.  PUTNAM,
REASON,  TRUTH  AND  HISTORY  (1981);  L.  WrrrGENSTEIN,  PHILOSOPHICAL  INVESTIGATIONS
(1953).  The  most  valuable  claims  here  tend  to  come  from  pragmatism,  and  not  from
postmodernism.
The most general  way to connect these points is to suggest that the tasks of administrative  law
include many  things:  the correction  of failures in the market for product  safety;  the creation  of a
stable system for the regulation  of financial  markets; the development of an energy  policy that will
encourage domestic production; the provision of medical care to the poor and the elderly; the regula-
tion of unsafe conditions in  the airline industry and the streets; the elimination of racial and sexual
discrimination;  the protection  against international environmental problems  such as the destruction
of the ozone layer and global warming; the incorporation  of disabled people into a society built for
the able-bodied; the control of carcinogens in the workplace without high unemployment or financialADMINISTRATIVE  SUBSTANCE
individual freedom and economic welfare.  Sometimes,  however, private
markets fail to provide either.48  When markets fail, democratic controls
are the only viable option.  Although the arguments for social regulation
are quite straightforward,  they have often been derided in the last  dec-
ade, particularly by the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations, as well as
welfare  economists  and others  who  invoke pre-New  Deal principles  of
private right.49  It is therefore worthwhile to provide a brief outline of the
reasons for social regulation.  In outlining those reasons, I make no claim
to special  originality.  My goal is simply to categorize some of the foun-
dations for regulatory  controls.
Sometimes markets fail simply because consumers lack necessary in-
formation.  For example, the market often fails to provide enough infor-
mation  about the risks  posed by carcinogens  in the workplace, in food,
and in  drugs.  Economic markets  often underproduce  information,  be-
cause information has some of the characteristics  of a public good. 5 0  In
such cases,  regulation  might remedy  the problem.  Through  supplying
information,  the  government  also bolsters  the  democratic  process  and
promotes  public education.  Government  programs  can simultaneously
encourage freedom of choice and protect health and lives.
Markets also fail when they do not take full account of the costs that
private conduct imposes on other people.  Pollution is an obvious exam-
ple.51  Environmental damage imposes  severe costs, and these costs fall
on numerous people.  But the persons injured (not just living adults, but
children and members of future generations as well) lack the knowledge
and organization to bring suit or otherwise seek redress.  In these situa-
tions, a regulatory  response,  which forces  those who  produce  harm to
pay for it and ultimately to eliminate or to reduce it, is entirely justified. 5 2
Somewhat more subtly,  government controls can sometimes  facili-
tate an outcome that people want but cannot obtain in the marketplace.
costs;  and the  regulation  of toxic  chemicals  in the air  and  water.  The role  of such concepts  as
"paradox,"  "bricolage,"  "meaning  on  the  fly,"  or "Neurath's  boat"  in addressing  these problems
remains something of a puzzle.  See Edley, supra note  3,  at 594 (quoting Michelman,  Postmodern
Constitutionalism  (unpublished  manuscript)).
48.  I do not deal with redistributive arguments here.  For a discussion of some of the complexi-
ties, see C. SUNSTEIN, supra note *, at 55-57,  61-64.
49.  See, eg.,  R. EPSTEIN, supra note  10 (arguing for constitutional  assault on  New Deal).
50.  See  P.  ASCH,  CONSUMER  SAFETY  REGULATION:  PUTING  A  PRICE ON  LIFE  AND  LIMB
50-51  (1988).
51.  A less obvious example is the loss of endangered species, which provide a range of medici-
nal, agricultural,  educational,  and recreational  benefits to human beings.
52.  My usage is admittedly pre-Coasean  here, in the sense that it relies on notions about causa-
tion that disregard some complex  issues.  The "victims"  of pollution should sometimes be treated as
causal  actors, if they could have avoided the harm at low cost.  See Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3  J. L. & ECON.  1 (1960)  (discussing reciprocal  nature  of causation).
Vol.  1991:607]DUKE LAW JOURNAL
For example, people may want a recycling program provided that every-
one participates.  They may not, however, be willing to recycle on their
own unless they know that everyone will participate.  A world in which
everyone recycles  can thus be obtained  only with governmental  help.  A
governmentally  mandated  recycling  program can satisfy  private wishes
far better than the market,  which  is  of course incapable  of mandating
universal recycling.  In this way, government  can  solve collective action
problems and prisoner's dilemmas.5 3
This point helps support government controls, not only in the envi-
ronmental  arena,  but  in  energy  conservation,  automobile  safety,  and
other areas.  In these settings, governmental coordination  of private be-
havior structures  and organizes private choices,  and should  not be seen
as rejecting them.
These  arguments  for  regulation  involve  standard  cases  of market
failure.  Even those who are firmly committed to laissez-faire should ac-
cept them  in principle.54  But even where  efficiency  arguments  provide
little or  no support for regulation, democratic  principles  often  support
government  action.  Sometimes  the strongest  arguments  for  regulation
sound  in democracy  rather than efficiency.  For  example,  people  often
desire  political  outcomes  that are different  from  and  even  inconsistent
with their preferences as consumers.55  Some people favor stringent envi-
ronmental laws even though they rarely venture outdoors; others support
the protection of endangered  species even though they do not personally
benefit from the existence of those species; still others seek laws that for-
bid race and sex discrimination even though their own behavior is hardly
race- or gender-neutral.  As citizens,  people frequently  support govern-
ment regulation  that diverges from their behavior  as consumers.5 6
53.  See R. HARDIN,  MORALITY  WITHIN  THE LIMrrs  OF REASON  47-59 (1988)  (arguing that
modem  states elect rules that solve coordination and collective  action problems).
54.  For example, many of these arguments can be found in the final chapter of J. MILL, POLIT-
ICAL  ECONOMY, supra note 36, notwithstanding Mill's celebrated opposition to paternalism and his
insistence that the only  legitimate basis for  government intervention  is  to prevent  harm  to others.
See  J.  MILL,  ON  LIBERTY  (1885)  (characterizing  intervention  as  generally  counter  to  liberty
interests).
55.  See, eg.,  H. MARGOLIS,  SELFISHNESS,  ALTRUISM,  AND  RATIONALITY  82-95  (1982)  (dis-
cussing citizen  preferences);  Sen,  Rational  Fools: A  Critique of the Behavioral  Foundations of Eco-
nomic Theory, in BEYOND  SELF-INTEREST  25  (.  Mansbridge  ed.  1990)  (arguing against economic
models based  on egotistic behavior).
56.  It is tempting to respond that political  behavior is at best a confused reflection of "actual"
choice because  voters, unlike consumers, do not fully realize that they must bear the  costs of pro-
grams they support.  This explanation has some plausibility, but it is far too crude and general.  For
one thing, it fails to recognize that people, in their capacity as citizens,  may seek to implement their
highest or most altruistic  goals through government.  Social  and cultural  norms often  pressure peo-
ple, as citizens,  to be concerned about the welfare of others and to care about the public interest.  A
liberal  republic  should  not  disparage  these  concerns.  See  Elster, Sefishness  and Altruism,  in
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Similarly,  political action can and sometimes  should  overcome  ex-
isting private preferences and beliefs.  Preferences, desires, and beliefs do
not exist in a vacuum;  they often adapt to existing legal rules and social
practices.  Without  the possibility  of government action,  current prac-
tices sometimes seem intractable, and people resign themselves to them.57
People adapt their behavior and even their desires and beliefs to the sta-
tus quo.  In such cases,  there  is a serious  obstacle to political freedom.
Freedom consists not merely in satisfying one's desires, but also in ensur-
ing that desires are not formed under unjust conditions, or under circum-
stances that impede their free development.58 This concept of freedom is
highly  congenial to American public law.59
If people can act in concert through government,  they can remove
some of these obstacles.  Social movements that involve the environment,
labor,  employment,  poverty,  anti-discrimination,  and  occupational
health and safety are conspicuous examples.  Through the process of col-
lective  action,  government  can  counteract  constraints  on  preference
formation.
Considerations of democracy therefore support regulatory programs
even when the claims of economic efficiency do not.  Regulation may also
be justified as a means  of increasing opportunities  when markets  fail to
provide  them in sufficient numbers.  Government can protect the back-
ground conditions  for private choice  by  ensuring sufficient  diversity to
prevent existing arrangements from constraining preference formation.6°
BEYOND  SELF-INTEREST,  supra note  55,  at 44;  Jencks,  Varieties of Altruism, in  BEYOND  SELF-
INTEREST, supra note  55, at 53.  The collective character of politics  helps to explain this phenome-
non.  People may seek to achieve altruistic aspirations only if they are assured that other citizens will
do so as well.
57.  See  3.  ELSTER,  SOUR  GRAPES:  STUDIES  IN  THE SUBVERSION  OF  RATIONALITY  (1983)
(preferences  underlying  a choice  may  be  shaped  by  unjust  constraints);  A.  SEN,  supra note  41
(same);  Nussbaum, supra note  41,  at 203  (discussing  a social  democracy  that provides  for "good
human  functioning,"  political  mechanisms  to support  its citizens,  and  institutional  arrangements
that redefine the concept of private ownership).  Much empirical data confirms the claim that prefer-
ences adapt to existing entitlements.  See, eg., Kahneman,  Knetch & Thaler, Experimental  Tests of
the Endowment Effect and the  Coase  Theorem,  98 J. POL.  ECON.  1325  (1990)  (arguing  that the
minimum  compensation  necessary  to entice an  individual to  give  up  an existing  entitlement  may
greatly  exceed the maximum  price that the same individual would be willing to pay for the entitle-
ment); Knetch,  The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM.
ECON.  REV.  1277  (1989)  (arguing that preferences are affected by the status  quo).
58.  A particular problem is the potential of race- or gender-based  caste systems to accompany
markets and to impede preference formation.  Government controls are necessary to eliminate these
caste-like  characteristics.  See Sunstein,  Why  Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, 8 Soc.  PHIL.  &
POL.  22 (1991).
59.  See Sunstein, supra note  17,  at 1558-62.
60.  See Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE
L.J. 1537,  1560-66  (1983)  (discussing need to provide conditions for free formation of preferences).
In this  discussion,  I do  not address  the view  that regulation  sometimes  redistributes  resources  to
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For example, some people may not value environmental diversity or en-
dangered  species  simply  because  the market  does  not provide  them  in
sufficiently visible places.  A regulatory response  is entirely appropriate.
All of this suggests that notwithstanding the frequent objection that
governmental  regulation  is "paternalistic"  or insufficiently  respectful  of
private choice,61 substantial  regulatory  controls are often fully justified.
First:  In cases of inadequate information, harms unaccounted  for by the
market,  and  governmental  coordination  of private behavior,  regulation
sometimes facilitates the satisfaction of private desires and does not reject
individual  choice.  Second:  Regulation can vindicate democracy by pro-
tecting  collective  aspirations  and  altruistic  goals that override  the  out-
comes of markets.  This hardly constitutes an objectionable  interference
with freedom.  Third:  Government can properly play a role in increasing
available opportunities and information,  and in doing so it can improve
market outcomes.  This is so even in a system that prizes (as all systems
should)  private  property,  freedom  of  contract,  and  other  voluntary
arrangements.
III.  REGULATORY  SUCCESSES  AND  FAILURES
A.  Successes
How effective  has regulation proved in practice?  In fact the record
shows many successes. 62  Despite its popularity, the view that social reg-
ulation has generally failed is far too crude.  In numerous areas-includ-
ing  environmental  protection,  automobile  safety,  civil  rights,  and  the
protection of endangered species-regulation  has resulted in substantial
improvements.
A notable example is the effort to reduce air pollution.  Since 1970,
both  the  levels  and  emissions  of all major  pollutants  in  the  United
States-including sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and lead-have sub-
stantially decreased. 63  In addition, the vast majority  of counties in the
United States now comply with national air quality goals with respect to
groups or individuals with (or without)  a good claim to them.  For a brief discussion of this view, see
C. SUNSTEIN,  supra note  *, at 55-57, 61-64.
61.  See supra note  10 and accompanying text.
62.  See C. SUNSTEIN,  supra note  *, at 239-41.
63.  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION  AGENCY,  OFFICE  OF  AIR  QUALITY  PLANNING  AND
STANDARDS,  NATIONAL  AIR  POLLUTANT  EMISSION  ESTIMATES  2 (1990).  Lead reductions  have
been  especially dramatic.  The ambient concentration of lead decreased  no  less than 94%  between
1975  and  1981.  See Table  1 infra.  The  effort  to reduce  transportation  emissions  has  also been
remarkably siccessful.  Transportation emissions have been reduced from 122.6  million metric tons
in  1975 to merely  3.5  million in  1986.  CONSERVATION  FOUNDATION,  STATE  OF  THE  ENVIRON-
MENT:  A VIEW TOWARD  THE NINETIES  152-53  (1987).  Consider the  following data:
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all major pollutants.64  Although substantial  room remains for improve-
ment,  air  in  the  United  States  is  much  cleaner  and  healthier  than  it
would have been without regulatory controls.
Water  pollution  control  has  also  achieved  significant  gains.  The
Great Lakes are much cleaner than they were in 1965, when hundreds of
Table 1.  National  Ambient Concentration  of Nitrogen Dioxide, Total Suspended Particulates
(TSP) and Lead
Year  Nitrogen Dioxide  TSP  (pIg/m
3)  Lead (ptg/m
3)
1975  0.029  61.9  1.04
1976  0.029  62.8  1.05
1977  0.029  62.9  1.16
1978  0.029  62.4  1.04
1979  0.029  63.4  0.79
1980  0.028  64.8  0.55
1981  0.027  60.2  0.44
1982  0.026  50.2  0.47
1983  0.025  49.7  0.39
1984  0.026  50.9  0.35
1985  0.025  48.5  0.23
1986  0.025  48.4  0.15
1987  0.025  49.4  0.12
SOURCES:  COUNCIL  ON  ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY,  ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY  ANNUAL
REPORT  1987-88, 351 (Table 3-4) (1989);  COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY, 20TH ANNUAL
REPORT,  469 (Table 41)  (1991).
COMMENTS:  Nitrogen  dioxide contributes  to acid  deposition as well  as causing adverse health
effects.  TSP is a measure of overall  concentrations of particulate matter in the air.  Lead  causes  a
variety of adverse health effects.  Nitrogent dioxide and TSP reductions have been relatively modest.
Table 2:  National  Ambient Concentrations  of Sulfur Dioxide, Carbon Monoxide and Ozone by
Parts Per Million
Year  Sulfur Dioxide  Carbon Monoxide  Ozone
1975  0.015  11.96  0.153
1976  0.016  11.32  0.153
1977  0.015  10.66  0.155
1978  0.014  10.17  0.156
1979  0.012  9.80  0.142
1980  0.011  9.08  0.145
1981  0.010  8.82  0.131
1982  0.0098  8.13  0.128
1983  0.0094  8.02  0.145
1984  0.0095  8.00  0.130
1985  0.0089  7.19  0.127
1986  0.0086  7.21  0.123
1987  0.0084  6.88  0.129
SOURCES:  COUNCIL  ON  ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY,  ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY  ANNUAL
REPORT  1987-88,  351  (Table  3-4)  (1989);  COUNCIL  ON  ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY  20TH ANNUAL  REPORT, 469 (Table 41)  (1991).
COMMENTS:  Sulfur dioxide contributes to acid deposition and visibility impairment.  All three of
these pollutants cause additional adverse health  effects.  The data suggests that legislation  has been
fairly successful at reducing the ambient concentrations of each of these pollutants, although it is not
clear  that the  reductions  reached  predicted  levels.  All  three  have  declined  steadily over the last
eleven years, most notably sulfur dioxide.
64.  See  COUNCIL ON  ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY,  ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY:  THE TWEN-
TIETH ANNUAL  REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON  ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY  8-9  (1990)  (discussing
environmental  trend  data  and  noting several  pollutants that  have  been reduced  to meet  national
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beaches had to be closed.65  The reductions in levels of DDT, PCB,  and
dieldrin contaminants in Great Lake fish have been especially dramatic. 66
A number of harmful nutrients have been reduced by nearly fifty percent
in national rivers.67  Lead levels in our waters have also been significantly
reduced. 6 8  As a result, many rivers are much cleaner on balance, includ-
ing the Potomac, the Hudson, and parts of the  Mississippi. 69
Regulatory successes have not been limited to the environment.  The
Civil  Rights Act of  1964  has  produced gains  for blacks,  including  de-
creases  in  employment  discrimination  based  on  race.70  Similar  gains
have been achieved in combatting sex discrimination. 71
Several  other regulatory programs impressively  accomplished  their
goals.  For example,  the  automobile  safety  regulations  promulgated  in
the late  1960s and early  1970s72  have prevented  numerous injuries  and
saved lives.  According to one estimate, automobile fatalities would have
been  about forty percent  higher  in  1983  if not  for governmental  con-
trols.73  In addition, an estimated  34,000 lives were  saved between  1966
and 1974 as a result of occupant safety standards.74  The annual benefits
of automobile  regulation are extremely high-estimated  at over  $10  bil-
lion.7 5  Moreover,  there  is  a favorable ratio  of benefits  to costs  in this
area.
76
65.  COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY, supra note 64, at 325-36,  346-70; C. SUNSTEIN,
supra note *, at 77.
66.  COUNCIL  ON ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY, supra note 64, at 319-21.
67.  See id.; COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL  QUALITY,  ANNUAL  REPORT  1987-1988,  at  318-
26.
68.  See CONSERVATION  FOUNDATION,  STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT  90 (1987).
69.  Crandall,  Learning the Lessons,  11  WILSON Q.  69,  69 (1987).
70.  Id. at 80.  The disputes in the empirical literature  generally deal with the magnitude of the
change,  not its  direction.  See  Freedman,  Changes in the Labor Market for Black Americans, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC  ACTIVITY 67 (1973); Donohue & Heckman, Re-Evaluating  Fed-
eral Civil Rights Policy, 79  GEo.  L.J. 1713,  1715-22  (1991);  Heckman  & Paynor, Determining the
Impact of Federal  Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks:  A Study of South
Carolina, 79  AM.  ECON.  REV.  139 (1989);  Leonard,  The Impact of Affirmative-A ction Regulation
and Equal-Employment Law on Black Employment, 4 J. ECON.  PERSI'.  47 (1990).
71.  See Donohue, Prohibiting  Sex Discrimination  in the Workplace:  An Economic Perspective,
56 U. CHI. L. REv.  1337,  1360-62 (1989)  (noting that since Title VII's equal employment  opportu-
nity initiatives  were  enacted,  the earnings  and  occupational positions  of women  and  blacks  have
improved dramatically),  and citations therein.
72.  See eg.,  Federal Motor Vehicle  Safety Standards,  49 C.F.R.  § 371.21  (1969).
73.  R. CRANDALL,  H. GRUENSPECHT,  T. KEELER & L. LAVE,  REGULATING THE  AUTOMO-
BILE 75  (1986).
74.  Id. at 57.
75.  Id.  at 77-78.
76.  For example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's  (NHSTA) fuel system
integrity controls costs only $300,000 per life saved.  See C. SUNSTEIN,  supra note *, app. B at 239-
41.  Some  regulations  pay  for  themselves  purely  in terms  of health and  related  savings.  See  R.
CRANDALL,  H. GRUENSPECHT,  T. KEELER  & L. LAVE, supra note 73,  at 78-79.  Other initiatives
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B.  Failures
To emphasize regulatory successes is not to deny that regulation has
frequently failed.  In some cases, regulatory controls have accomplished
little  or  nothing.  In  others,  regulation  has  imposed  enormously  high
costs for speculative benefits.  Moreover, regulation has sometimes aggra-
vated the very problem that it was designed to solve.77  Regulatory  strat-
egies  often  produce  insufficient  benefits,  and  sometimes  they  create
affirmative harm.
For example, between  1972  and  1985  the United States spent over
$632 billion for pollution control. 7 8  Some studies suggest that alternative
strategies  could  have  achieved  the  same  gains  at  nearly  one-half  the
cost.79  Some of OSHA's regulations  impose enormous  costs for uncer-
tain gains.80  The Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA) has promul-
gated only seven regulations to control toxic substances in the air,81 and
numerous substances remain uncontrolled.  By delaying the entry of ben-
eficial  drugs  into  the market,  the Food and Drug  Administration  has
dramatically  increased  risks to life and health in some settings.82
Regardless  of how  the gains  and losses from  social regulation  are
valued, there can be little doubt that there  is far too much government
regulation in some areas, and far too little in others.83  Even more funda-
have  also  saved  lives  cheaply.  The  Environmental  Protection  Agency's  (EPA)  regulation  of
trihalomethanes  saves  a  life  at  only  $315,000.  The  Consumer  Product  Safety  Commission's
mandatory smoke detector rule costs between  $0 and $85,000 for every life saved.  See C. SUNsTEIN,
supra note *, at app. B, for an outline and discussion.
77.  See Sunstein,  Paradoxes  of the Regulatory State, 57  U. CHI. L. REv.  407  (1990).
78.  B. Ackerman & R. Stewart, Reforming Environmental  Law:  The Democratic Case  for Mar-
ket Incentives, 13  COLUM. J. ENvTL.  L. 171,  177 (1988)  (citing OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING  AND
EVALUATION,  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION  AGENCY,  THE  COST  OF CLEAN  AIR  AND  WATER
(1984)).
79.  See T. TIETENBERG,  EMISSIONS  TRADING:  AN  EXERCISE  IN  REFORMING  POLLUTION
POLICY 41-45 (1985)  (six of eight studies that compared command-and-control  allocation with low-
cost  allocation  found  that  command-and-control  pollution  programs  cost  78%  more  than
necessary).
80.  Indeed, some of the Occupational  Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) most expen-
sive workplace  regulations have  produced no  discernible  improvements for workers.  See W.  VIS-
CUSI,  RISK  BY  CHOICE:  REGULATING  HEALTH  AND  SAFETY  IN  THE  WORKPLACE 25-36  (1983).
Moreover, the entire pattern of OSHA carcinogen regulation is questionable.  Some regulations cost
up to  $40 million per life saved;  at the same time, many  carcinogenic  hazards remain completely
unregulated.  See J. MENDELOFF,  THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION 21-24 (1988)
(cost per cancer death  prevented, with regard to  vinyl chloride, is $40 million (in  1985 dollars)).
81.  See Note, Toward  Sensible Regulation of  Hazardous  Air Pollutants Under  Section 112 of  the
Clean Air Act, 63  N.Y.U. L. REV.  612, 613-14  (1988).
82.  See, e.g.,  H.  GRABOWSKI  & J. VERNON,  THE REGULATION  OF PHARMACEUTICALS  9-13,
29-47 (1983)  (discussing  the slower rate  of pharmaceutical  innovation  as a result of government
regulation and citing several studies that support this claim).
83.  The use of cost-benefit analysis to measure the successes and failures of regulation can raise
serious problems.  These problems are especially severe insofar as we rely, as economists usually do,
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mentally,  in many areas the question is not whether the level of govern-
ment regulation is appropriate, but whether the government has chosen
the suitable strategies  to accomplish its goals. 84
I have discussed  cases in which regulation has been both inefficient
and ineffective.  From the standpoint of democracy,  regulation has  fre-
quently failed as well.  First, education about the nature and level of risks
in the environment and in the workplace has not been a high priority for
regulators.  On  this  score,  the public  is  poorly  informed  and  thus ex-
tremely ill-served.  Partly because of the absence of education and disclo-
sure,  public  participation  and  real  accountability  on  questions  of
regulation have  not  characterized  the rise of modern  bureaucracy.  In-
stead, sensational but misleading  anecdotes and interest-group  pressures
have played a far too prominent role.
Second, the centralization of policy in national bureaucracies dimin-
ishes the prospects for local decisionmaking in the private or public sec-
tor.  Local  decisions  inculcate  a sense of responsibility  in citizens  and
encourage  participation  far more  effectively  than  centralization.  The
current system unnecessarily  sacrifices the values of federalism.
on some version of private "willingness  to pay"  as the basis for  assessing costs and benefits.  As I
have noted, social regulation is often based  on the values reflected  in democratic aspirations rather
than on private consumption choices.  See supra notes 57-61  and accompanying text.  In these cases,
valuing costs  and benefits  by private willingness  to pay can  produce  perverse results,  because this
process measures the worth of democratic aspirations by reference to the very consumption choices
that democracy attempts  to override.
Moreover, the conversion of diverse social goods into a dollar value may poorly reflect citizens'
considered judgments about regulatory outcomes.  For example, economic "use value"  may inappro-
priately value the interest in beaches, streams, and animals.  Economic valuations of these resources
may do violence to the way that these resources are, or should be, experienced.  On the other hand,
tradeoffs in regulation are inevitable, and resolving tradeoffs without reference to economic consider-
ations is usually most difficult.
Finally, willingness to pay is a function of ability to pay.  In a world with an unequal  distribu-
tion of income and wealth, it will be controversial to assert that government policy should be deter-
mined  by  how  much  people  are  able  to  pay  for  things  such  as  environmental  quality  and
occupational  safety and  health.  For more discussion of these  issues,  see  M. NUSSBAUM,  LOVE'S
KNOWLEDGE:  ESSAYS  ON  PHILOSOPHY AND  LITERATURE  56-66  (1990)  (discussing diversity  of
social  goods);  C. TAYLOR,  PHILOSOPHY  AND  THE HUMAN  SCIENCES  230, 243  (1985)  (same);  An-
derson,  Values  Risks, and Market Norms,  17  PHIL. & Pun. AFF.  54,  57-59  (1987)  (democratic
willingness to spend money  to avoid certain  risks is  based on considered judgment that public  re-
sponsibility is greater in some situations than  in others).
Notwithstanding  these problems,  cost-benefit  analysis can  be  an  exceptionally  useful  tool to
compare  the advantages and disadvantages  of regulatory strategy.  It can reveal  when  the gains of
regulation are far greater than the losses, or when the reverse is true.  And it is striking to see that a
comparison of costs and benefits  often shows that social  regulation has been successful.  See supra
notes 62-76  and accompanying  text.
84.  See Howse, Prichard & Trebilcock, Smaller or  Smarter Government?, 40 U. TORONTO  L.J.
498  (1990)  (discussing  shift towards  incentive-oriented  policy instruments  to achieve  public policy
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Finally, the current  regulatory  framework does not focus national
attention on the central issues-the appropriate nature, extent, and level
of risk reduction.  Instead, Congress  centers its efforts on obscure or in-
comprehensible  questions.  The combined effects of lack of publicity and
education,  nationalization,  and failure to focus  on the central  issues of
regulatory  policy  have  severely  compromised  the  democratic  goals  of
American public law.
C.  The Sources of Failure
The preceding examination of the regulatory state reveals a range of
successes  and failures.  Prevention  of the failures  is a central  challenge
for those concerned about improving the system for the future.  In meet-
ing this challenge, the first step is to identify the sources  of failure.
A number of factors are relevant here:  the government's inability to
coordinate  different  programs  that  cover  related  aspects  of the  same
problem;  Congress's  unwillingness  to  understand  that  regulatory  pro-
grams involve complex tradeoffs  among competing social  goals;  interest
group "capture"  of the regulatory process (an important but overstated
phenomenon);  and failure on the part of agencies to deal with regulatory
obsolescence over time.  But an especially pervasive and often overlooked
problem is structural.  It involves the creation of poor incentives,  rather
than the hiring of opportunistic or susceptible administrators.  Above all,
social regulation  is pervaded  by strategies  that have unanticipated  sys-
temic consequences, that deal with the symptoms rather than the causes
of social problems, that direct attention to the wrong places, and that are
insufficiently  sensitive  to the  pressures  that they impose  on regulators
and the private sector.
A large source of regulatory failure in the United States is the use of
rigid, highly bureaucratized  "command-and-control"  regulation.  The re-
sulting  programs  dictate  national  control  strategies  for  hundreds,
thousands,  or even millions of companies  and individuals  in an  excep-
tionally diverse nation. Command-and-control regulation  is a dominant
part of American government in such areas as environmental protection
and occupational safety and health.
In  the  environmental  context,  command-and-control  approaches
usually take the form of regulatory  requirements  of the "best  available
technology"  (so-called  BAT  requirements).85  BAT  strategies  pervade
85.  BAT strategies must be distinguished from so-called "technology  forcing"  statutes, which
do  require innovation.  See  B. ACKERMAN  & W. HASSLER,  CLEAN  COAL/DIRTY  AIR:  OR How
THE CLEAN  AIR  ACT  BECAME  A  MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR  BAIL-OUT  FOR  HIGH-SULPHUR  COAL
PRODUCERS  AND  WHAT  SHOULD  BE DONE  ABOUT  IT (1981).  Technology-forcing  has often ac-
complished  considerable  good.  The major drawback  of technology-forcing  is  that government  is
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federal law.  Indeed, they are a defining characteristic of the regulation of
the air, water, and workplace conditions. 8 6
One of the many problems with BAT strategies is that they system-
atically  ignore  the enormous  differences  among  plants,  industries,  and
geographical areas in the United States.  In view of these differences, na-
tionally  uniform  technological  requirements  are  wildly  inefficient.  It
does not seem sensible to impose identical technological requirements  on
diverse  industries-regardless  of whether  they  are  polluted  or  clean,
populated or empty, or expensive or cheap to clean  up.
The problems go deeper still.  BAT requirements usually apply only
to new entrants in the market.  By requiring all new industries to adopt
costly technology  while allowing  existing  plants and industries  to  con-
form to more lenient standards, BAT strategies  penalize new  products.
In this way,  they discourage  investment and perpetuate  old, dirty tech-
nology.  In the environmental  arena,  for  example,  BAT  strategies  dis-
courage new  pollution  control technologies  by  requiring that industries
adopt new technology for no financial gain.  Under the BAT approach,  a
company that innovates in this area will simply have to  invest more  in
pollution  control.  BAT requirements  punish  such companies  for their
development of new control technology, rather than rewarding them.  In
addition,  BAT  strategies  are  extremely  expensive  to  enforce,  imposing
extraordinary monitoring burdens  on agencies  that employ them.87
Perhaps worse, by focusing on the technology at the end of the pipe,
BAT strategies are aimed at superficial symptoms rather than underlying
causes of pollution.  For example,  the EPA has  forced coal-fired  power
plants to adopt costly "scrubbing"  strategies to deal with sulfur dioxide
emissions that cause acid rain. 88  A far better approach would use finan-
cial incentives  to encourage American  consumers  and industries  to  in-
crease  energy  conservation  and  efficiency,  and  to  shift  to  cleaner,
renewable fuels.
usually not in  the best position  to judge the amount  of technological  advance  that  is realistic  or
desirable.  A good portion of these programs  depends  on government guesswork.
86.  See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 741 l(a)(1) (West Supp.  1991)  (standard should reflect the
"degree  of emission  limitation  achievable  through  the application  of the  best system  of emission
reduction");  Clean  Water Act,  33  U.S.C.  §  1316(a)(1)  (1988)  (standard  determined  by  "the  best
available  demonstrated  control  technology");  Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Act  of  1970,  29
U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)  (1988)  (standard should reflect  "latest available scientific data in  the field").  In
my criticisms here, I  draw on  the helpful discussion  in Ackerman  & Stewart, Reforming Environ-
mental Law:  The Democratic  Case for Market Incentives, 13  COLUM.  J. ENVTL.  L.  171  (1988).
87.  See, e.g.,  OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY  & HEALTH  ADMIN.,  U.S.  DEP'T OF LABOR,  REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS  ON  OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY  AND  HEALTH  FOR FISCAL  YEAR
1988 xiv (1990)  ($151,702,000  out of total OSHA  1988  fiscal year budget of $235,474,000 allocated
to federal  and state enforcement).
88.  See B. ACKERMAN  & W.  HASSLER,  CLEAN  COAL/DIRTY  AIR  (1981).
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Most fundamentally,  the BAT  approach  is  severely  deficient from
the standpoint of a well-functioning political process.  BAT strategies en-
sure that citizens and representatives will focus their attention on largely
incidental  and nearly  impenetrable  questions  about  currently  available
technologies,  rather than on the appropriate levels of reduction.8 9  Tech-
nological  debates  are  singularly  ill-suited  for  democratic  resolution.
They  also distract  attention from the central  issue  of determining  the
appropriate  degree  and nature  of regulatory  protection.  Moreover,  the
focus on "means"  increases the power of well-organized private groups,
by allowing  them  to use regulation  to  serve their own  parochial  ends.
The promotion of ethanol  (helpful  to corn farmers  although not  neces-
sarily to environmental protection) and scrubbers (helpful to the eastern
coal  industry although not necessarily  to air quality) are prominent  ex-
amples  of interest group influence on BAT-focused  systems.
In these respects, BAT strategies are emblematic of a large problem
in current regulation.  Centralization at the national level diminishes op-
portunities  for  citizen  participation;  it  also  promotes  struggles  among
well-organized  factions.  The  focus  on technological  details  and  sensa-
tional incidents ensures  that public education  about risk levels  and risk
comparisons  will be incomplete  and  episodic.  These  characteristics  of
contemporary  administrative  law  fall  far short  of guaranteeing  demo-
cratic  control  over  decisions  about  how  best  to  characterize  and  to
achieve  social goals.
Another problem, reflected well in BAT strategies, is the creation of
what we might call paradoxes of the regulatory  state.  90  These paradoxes
occur when programs turn out to be self-defeating, in the sense that they
bring  about  results  that  are  precisely  opposite  of those  intended.  As
noted, regulation that requires the best available technology actually dis-
courages  technological  development.  By  imposing  expensive  require-
ments  on  companies  that  develop  better  pollution  control  equipment,
BAT strategies stifle actions that could lead to enormous gains in clean-
ing up the environment.
Much American regulation (including BAT strategies) also embod-
ies  the  paradox  created  by  the idea  that  especially  stringent  controls
should be imposed on new sources  of pollution, and that existing indus-
tries should be regulated leniently  or not at all.  This is a strategy  that
existing industries favor, since it allows regulation to stifle new competi-
tion.  The paradox arises because a decision to regulate only new health
and safety  risks will perpetuate  old  risks, and ultimately  impair health
89.  See  Ackerman & Stewart, supra note  86.
90.  See  generally  Sunstein,  supra  note  77  (suggesting  reforms  to  restructure  regulatory
institutions).
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and safety.  New  risk  strategies  increase  the  costs  of new  sources  and
products, encourage consumers  to resort to older  sources and practices,
and  perpetuate  the  use  of  old,  especially  dirty  facilities  (like  power
plants) and products (like automobiles). 91  Existing industries can be ex-
pected to favor these types of strategies, but the reasons for doing so bear
no relation to rational regulatory outcomes.
A final regulatory  paradox,  also embodied  in  BAT approaches,  is
that strict government controls, and legal requirements that forbid trade-
offs,  produce  underregulation  as  well  as  overregulation.  Strict  regula-
tion-applied universally without regard to the diversity of the regulated
class-will, of course, bring about overregulation  of some of those who
are subject to regulatory requirements.  The substances that are regulated
will be stringently  controlled-in  all  likelihood  too stringently,  forcing
people to incur exceptionally  high costs for speculative  gains. 9 2
Ironically-and here is the paradox-stringent controls produce un-
derregulation  as well.  The threat of draconian regulatory  requirements
gives  industries  powerful  incentives  to  fight  regulation  wherever  they
can, and gives agencies a powerful incentive not to promulgate or enforce
them.  If Congress requires any regulation mandating  multi-million dol-
lar expenditures that will save but one life per year, the agency will pre-
dictably promulgate  stringent, but few,  regulations.
It should therefore come as no surprise that despite (or, better, be-
cause of) the stringency of the relevant  laws,  the government has  regu-
lated  only  seven toxic air pollutants (out  of hundreds), 93  fewer than a
dozen toxic water pollutants (again, out of hundreds),94 and until rela-
tively recently, only ten toxic substances in the workplace 95 (even though
the private organization that performed  some of OSHA's functions had
for several  years  recommended  lower  exposure  limits  for  hundreds  of
chemicals96).
The picture that emerges  from this discussion is not  a simple  one.
In some areas, government regulation has produced significant improve-
91.  See R. CRANDALL,  H. GRUENSPECHT,  T. KEELER & L. LAVE,  supra note 73, at 89.  For
instance, a good way to increase automobile pollution in the short run is to impose extremely costly
pollution  control requirements  on new  cars.  Some existing  motor vehicle regulations  do precisely
that.  See, eg., 42 U.S.C.A.  §§ 7521-7554 (West Supp.  1991)  (establishing new motor vehicle emis-
sion  and fuel standards).
92.  See J. Mendeloff, supra note 80, at 24-26.
93.  See Note, supra note 81,  at 613-14.
94.  See F. ANDERSON,  D. MANDELKER  & D. TARLOCK,  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION 439-
43 (1990).
95.  See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 80,  at 2.
96.  See id.
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ments.  In  others,  regulation  has  been  counterproductive,  ineffectual,
overly costly, or nonexistent.
The failings of regulation need not be attributed to legislative igno-
rance or irrationality;  some  of the problems quite plausibly result from
the self-interest of affected groups or of legislators themselves.  For exam-
ple, a decision to regulate new  risks, while leaving old ones unaffected,
may be a mechanism by which existing industries  use regulation to pre-
vent new competition.  In addition, technology-based regulation provides
a system whereby industry can slow down regulation; such strategies are
vulnerable to plausible lawsuits proclaiming  that existing technology  is
quite primitive.  Moreover, legislators can claim credit for enacting strin-
gent protections, while assuring industry that it will not in fact be regu-
lated at all, because any  resulting regulation would be too draconian  to
be enforceable.  In these respects, regulatory failures can often be under-
stood as a predictable legislative response to the various forces imposed
on legislators.
In  any  case,  faulty  structures  have  caused  many  of the  failures:
measures that do not take account of the incentive effects of government
strategies,  address  only  part of complex problems,  focus  on symptoms
rather than causes, and publicize misleading anecdotes rather than edu-
cating the public and benefitting from its involvement in the regulatory
process.
IV.  REGULATING  WITH  INCENTIVES
This account of regulatory performance should help produce a set of
entirely feasible reform strategies.  Above all, new  strategies would seek
to ensure  that regulation  is  efficient and effective,  in the sense that the
programs would promote their own purposes at reasonable costs.  These
reforms would  also promote democratic goals,  by ensuring accountabil-
ity, visibility, and participation in the administrative process.  There is no
reason  to  believe that these  strategies  cannot be implemented  through
existing institutions.  In fact, Congress and administrative  agencies have
already  moved in precisely  this direction.97  Legislative  incentives  will
sometimes  push  toward  the  status quo,  but recent  history  shows  that
there is  no reason to believe that this is an insuperable problem.
A.  General Lessons
At the most general level, an examination of regulatory performance
demonstrates that regulators should pay attention to the incentive effects
of regulatory statutes.  Policymakers should be aware of the possibility of
97.  See, e.g.,  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A.  §§  7651-7651o  (West Supp.  1991).
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strategic or  self-interested  adaptation  by  administrative  agencies  or by
members of the regulated  classes.  The  failures of many  existing strate-
gies were perfectly predictable responses to the often-counterintuitive  in-
centives created by those strategies. 98
Regulators  should  encourage  industry  to  address  harms  at their
source. In general, regulators should adopt strategies that will reduce the
introduction of dangerous substances, instead of merely controlling sub-
stances that have already been introduced.  In this regard, strategies that
leave the means of obtaining reduction to industry, rather than specifying
them in  detail,  will  prove  most  effective  in  eliminating  social  harms.
Rather than imposing complex technological  requirements on pollutants
as  they  exit the tailpipe,  it would  be best  to eliminate  lead and  other
dangerous pollutants from gasoline before they enter the tank.  Pollution
prevention, rather than technological  fixes,  should  guide environmental
policy.
9 9
Moreover,  Congress should  provide industries  with  incentives  that
favor regulation, where this is desired, rather than giving them reason to
oppose government  controls.  Existing  law makes  regulation  extremely
costly for industry and puts an enormous premium on countermeasures
and delay.  The best way to ensure that regulations  will be issued is to
create  incentives  for industry  to favor  them.  This  strategy  allows  the
burden  of inertia  to work for the establishment  of safety  levels rather
than against it.  In the area of toxic substances,  for example, regulators
might (as California currently  does 10) require industries to disclose the
existence  of risks to the public  until a regulation  has  been  issued that
establishes that the risks are insignificant.  Unfortunately, however, most
existing law creates powerful incentives  for inaction and delay.101
98.  For this reason many observers have concluded that Congress actually sought the failures.
See Stigler,  The  Theory of Economic Regulation, in  CHICAGO  STUDIES  IN POLITICAL  ECONOMY,
supra note  10, at 209  (on the interaction of party politics and industry regulation);  Pashigian, Envi-
ronmental Regulation:  Whose  Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, in CHICAGO  STUDIES IN POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY,  supra note  10, at 498 (elevating the role of self-interest in explaining  the regulation
of stationary sources).  The evidence does not, however, clearly support this view.  See  R. ARNOLD,
THE LOGIC  OF  CONGRESSIONAL  ACTION  225  (1990)  (asserting that congressional  action in energy
regulation  cannot be explained through  standard interest group  or ideological models;  such action
has resulted from complex interaction among citizen, expert, and politician attitudes and restructur-
ing of legislative situations  by coalition  leaders).
99.  This approach is encouraged in B. COMMONER,  MAKING PEACE WITH THE  PLANET 41-55
(1990).  Pollution prevention is, however, undesirable when  the pollutant in question cannot feasibly
be eliminated, or when its elimination will produce ancillary social losses that outweigh the benefits.
100.  See Roe, An  Incentive-Conscious  Approach to Toxic  Chemical Controls, 3 ECON.  DEv. Q.
179 (1989).  For a good critical discussion, see Stenzel, Right-to-Know Provisions  of  California's  Prop-
osition 65:  The Naivete of the Delaney Clause Revisited, 15  HARV.  ENV.  L. REV.  493  (1991).
101.  See J. MENDELOFF,  supra note  80, at  137.
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Regulatory reform can directly incorporate the lessons of regulatory
failure.  A general first step would be to adopt a strong presumption in
favor  of flexible,  market-oriented,  incentive-based  regulatory  strategies.
This principle  means  that Congress  and  administrators  should  impose
costs  on people  who  engage in harmful  activity, and  should  allow the
market,  rather  than bureaucracies,  to  decide how  that activity will  be
diminished.  Such an approach would make it more likely that regulation
will increase efficiency, promote its own purposes, and-by focusing pub-
lic attention  on the right questions-further democratic  goals as well.
Incentive-based  systems should  focus  on ends,  defined in  terms of
the number  of lives  saved  or  the amount  of pollution  reduced, rather
than on the means of achieving those ends.1 02  Means (and technologies)
are best left to the market, not to bureaucrats.  This strategy would also
avoid the numerous difficulties found in systems that require government
to establish specific  technological requirements  for industry. 1 03  Ideally,
the democratic  process would impose appropriate penalties,  in the form
of taxes designed  to discourage  and reduce  the risks  after determining
what the level of risk reduction  should be.
An advantage of a shift in emphasis from  means to  ends would be
that citizens  and representatives  would  decide the central  questions  of
how much pollution reduction there should be, and at what cost, rather
than resolving incidental  and often incomprehensible  questions  of what
"technology"  is  "best."  The  current  system  stifles  democratic  engage-
ment in regulatory  choices  by entangling  public processes  in debates  of
the latter sort.  The fixation on means  also creates incentives for interest
groups to ensure that they are favored in the legislature or in the bureau-
cracy.  By contrast,  a system of disclosure  and financial penalties  allows
little room for interest-group maneuvering.  In this respect, an incentive-
based approach  has enormous advantages  over the current  system.1°4
A focus on ultimate ends also promotes coordination and rationality
in regulation, by giving government an incentive to attend to appropriate
risk  levels in  different  areas,10 5 and  by bringing  a  salutary  measure  of
102.  The new  Clean Air Act  amendments take several steps in this direction.  See 42 U.S.C.A.
§§  7403-7431 (West Supp.  1991)  (toxic substances provision focuses on emissions levels rather than
means of reduction); id. §§ 7651-7651o (acid deposition provisions  focus  on emission levels).  It is
extremely unfortunate that in its regulation of automobile pollution, the Act specifies means. See id.
§ 7545(k) (requiring reformulated  gasoline-likely  a reflection  of pressures from agricultural  com-
munity).  Rather than requiring reformulated gasoline or increasing  mileage standards, a better ap-
proach  would simply tax gasoline, or tax the use of high-polluting vehicles.
103.  See supra text accompanying  notes 85-96.
104.  See Ackerman  & Stewart, supra note 86.
105.  See C. SUNSTEIN,  supra note *, app. B at 239-40 (cataloging expenditures per life saved and
demonstrating  the irrationality  of modem regulatory programs  across different  areas).
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structure and sense  to risk regulation.  Indeed,  the major advantage  of
incentive-based  approaches may be the increase in democratic accounta-
bility results from this cognitive shift.
Incentive-based  approaches  may be employed  in a  variety of con-
texts,  including  environmental  protection,  occupational  safety  and
health,  labor, and broadcasting.
B.  Particulars
1.  Market-Based  Incentives in the Environmental  Area.  A system
in which polluters must pay for the harms they cause leads government
to  focus on the right questions.  To ask how  much pollution  reduction
should be obtained, and  at what price,  will create  strong  incentives  to
improve knowledge of the effects of pollution and pollution control.  This
increased  premium  on  knowledge  would  be  yet another  gain.  I focus
here on emissions trading, taxation,  and disposal  systems.
a.  Emissions trading programs.  An  important  and  increasingly
used  incentive-based  system  is  "emissions  trading."  Under  emissions
trading  programs,  polluters  who  exceed  air pollution  standards 1 0 6  can
purchase  permits  from  other  polluters  who  are  below  the  maximum
levels.  Polluters may legally exceed the regulatory standards if they ob-
tain a permit  to do  so.  If  the emissions  trading  program  is  correctly
administered,  a region  will meet  the same pollution  standards  overall;
those who pollute too much will be balanced by those who reduce more
than they must.  The price of the permits is determined by the market. 107
In its ideal form, emissions trading would make two simple changes
in  current  law.  First,  it would  require  polluters  to pay  to pollute.  It
would not  (as  does  current  law) allow  people  to pollute  for free.  If a
company wants to send sulfur dioxide into the air, it must pay a fee to
obtain  a  permit  to  do  so.  Second,  pollution  permits  would  be  trade-
able.108  A company that is able to reduce its pollution below the permit-
ted level could sell all or part of its permit to someone else.  In this way,
companies  would  be  economically  rewarded  for  achieving  substantial
pollution  reduction.
In one bold stroke, a system of tradeable permits would create mar-
ket-based disincentives  to pollute and market-based  incentives  for pollu-
106.  E.g.,  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A.  §§ 7403-7431  (West Supp.  1991))
107.  For discussion of emissions trading, see Hahn & Hester, Where Did  All the Markets Go? An
Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6  YALE J. ON  REG.  109  (1989).
Of course,  emissions  trading is  only one part of a sensible environmental  program.  For the
most dangerous  pollutants, pollution prevention is the preferred strategy.
108.  See supra note  102 (discussing new  Clean Air Act).
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tion control.  By enlisting the aid of private markets, this system would
reward rather than punish technological innovation in pollution control.
Many  observers  persuasively  argue that the Clean  Air  and  Clean
Water Acts  should be amended to  substitute an emissions trading pro-
gram  for the  BAT  approach.1 °9  Suitably  designed,  emissions  trading
holds enormous promise.  Such programs do not require a single level of
technology, determined by  officials in Washington  for all industries.  In
fact, trading programs eliminate the need for centralized, national deter-
minations of what technology  is "available"  or feasibly  available  in the
future.
Some argue that emissions trading should be rejected on the theory
that it creates a "license to pollute,"  or that it wrongly treats clean air or
water like any other commodity traded on markets.'10  These commen-
tators  point out that those who  assault  or poison  others should  not be
allowed to  do  so merely  by paying a fee." 1  Why,  it  might be asked,
should pollution be treated differently?
This  objection raises  complex issues, and  I restrict myself to some
brief observations here.  As a first approximation,  a flat ban on an activ-
ity may well be preferable to a cash payment for resulting harm, assum-
ing  that  there  are  no  transaction  costs  (such  as  enforcement
expenditures),  when and only when the right  level of the underlying  activ-
ity is  zero.  The right level of assaults and poisonings seems to be zero.  It
would therefore be absurd to allow people to assault and poison others as
long as they are willing to compensate people for the harm.  Such a strat-
egy  would be  inconsistent  with the underlying  goal  of eliminating  the
conduct  altogether.1 12
By contrast, the appropriate  emissions level for many pollutants  is
well  above  zero.  For example,  complete  elimination  of sulfur dioxide
emissions would cause a severe energy shortage--one that would dramat-
ically  increase  poverty,  health  risks,  unemployment,  and  inflation.  In
this respect,  a ban on sulfur dioxide emissions would be difficult to jus-
tify.  For  those  pollutants  whose  continued  emission  is  necessary  to
109.  See Ackerman  & Stewart, supra note  86; Hahn  & Hester, supra note  107.
110.  See S.  KELMAN,  WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?:  ECONOMISTS  AND THE ENVIRONMENT  1-11
(1981).
111.  See id.
112.  Cf. Dau-Schmidt, An  Economic  Analysis of the Criminal  Law as a Preference-Shaping  Pol-
icy,  1990 DUKE  L.J.  I  (arguing that society  will criminalize  a particular  activity  and attempt  to
shape individual preferences and behavior through punishment whenever the social benefits of doing
so outweigh the social costs).
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achieve desirable social goals, a fee, designed to bring about the optimal
emissions level,  makes far more sense  than a ban.113
Still, emissions  trading has critics,  including  many  environmental-
ists.114  To be sure, implementation of such programs would require care-
ful design  and administration to ensure  (among other things) that large
numbers of polluters who receive permits through trades do not locate in
the same  areas, thus  creating  dangerous  "hot spots"-that is,  environ-
mentally disastrous  concentrations  of harmful substances. 115
In general, however,  most of the criticisms  are unpersuasive or ill-
informed.  For example,  emissions  trading  programs  will  not  increase
pollution levels.  Such programs simply achieve the desired degree of pol-
lution  reduction  at  the lowest possible  cost.  If the ultimate  goal is  to
reduce  pollution sharply,  then we  should  simply issue few permits.  As
noted, emissions trading systems offer the great advantage of putting the
power of deciding pollution levels back into the hands  of the citizenry,
rather than focusing on the often unintelligible question of what control
technology is "best" or "available."'1 16  Public institutions will decide the
ultimate and most important environmental policy issues, rather than the
confusing and only indirectly relevant  questions that current law makes
113.  This proposition is only a first approximation.  A decision to allow harmful activity as long
as the actor is willing to pay for it might be objectionable  on other grounds.  Such decisions might
treat the relevant interests as commodities,  and it may be wrong to do so.  Decisions to allow harm.
ful conduct at a  price might also have  undesirable  preference-shaping  effects.  In  the context  of
socially  necessary  activities  that  produce  incidental  pollution,  however,  these  objections  seem
unpersuasive.
A system that requires polluters to pay, rather than allowing them to pollute for free, would not
diminish the social opprobrium accorded to polluters.  Perhaps most likely, a payment-based  system
would not have any substantial preference-shaping effects.  Moreover, the arguments against treating
harmful  conduct  as a commodity  do not appear  to apply in the context of pollution control.  See
Radin, Market-Inalienability,  100 HARV. L. REv. 1849  (1987)  (arguing that some harmful conduct
should not be "commodified"  because of the resulting injury to "personhood").  In addition, shifting
the entitlement from the polluter to the public (by requiring the polluter to pay) could have desirable
preference-shaping  effects.  This decision at least establishes  the right starting point-giving breath-
ers, rather than polluters,  the entitlement.  See supra note  57 (discussing endowment  effects).
114.  For a discussion of the difficulties of emissions trading, see S. BREYER, supra note 3, at 171-
74, 271-84 (discussing problems including strategic bidding, administration, monitoring, initial allo-
cation of rights, and uncertainty  of future prices); S.  KELMAN, supra note  110; Latin, Ideal Versus
Real Regulatory Efficiency:  Implementation of Uniform Standards  and "Fine-Tuning"  Regulatory
Reforms, 37  STAN.  L. REv.  1267  (1985)  (arguing that, in  practice, an individualized  approach  to
regulation  is more inefficient than a uniform  approach  because  of increased  uncertainty,  decision-
making costs,  and strategic behavior).
To its credit, the Environmental  Defense Fund (EDF) has long been a strong advocate of emis-
sions trading.  See  Environmentalists,  Industry Disagree  on Basis for Nitrogen Oxides Regulation,
Daily Rep. Execs. (BNA)  No.  149,  at A10  (Aug. 2,  1991)  (stating that the EDF has "championed"
emissions trading);
115.  For an  especially good discussion of this and other problems, see S.  BREYER, supra note 3,
at 271-84.
116.  See supra notes  85-91  and accompanying  text.
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crucial.  Implementation problems can in turn be solved through market
mechanisms  and  "siting"  policies  preventing  undue  collection  of
polluters.1
7
These basic  ideas also  support an  emissions trading  system in  the
international  arena.  Under  such  a system,  some  countries  would  pay
others-in cash, retirement of debt, or new technology-to reduce emis-
sions levels  or to  protect biological  diversity.  In the frequent  cases  in
which pollution crosses national boundaries, a trading system would pro-
duce more efficient reduction techniques  and would also be more equita-
ble than an  approach  that would  require  all countries  to use the same
control technology.
b.  Taxation.  The  simplest reform  strategy  to control pesticides
and  other  toxic  substances  would  be  to  impose  a  tax  on  their  use.
Through  this single step, people would decrease  their use of pesticides.
This  strategy  would  encourage  the  use  of alternative  methods  of pest
control, including those that do not rely on chemicals.' 18  Perhaps funds
collected from a pesticide tax could be allocated to help farmers use bio-
logical techniques  efficiently.
Taxation can also be used to decrease automobile emissions.  Instead
of existing  regulations  that impose  technological  requirements  on  new
cars'19 (which  are often  ineffective  and difficult to monitor, and which
create incentives to keep old cars on the road longer120), Congress should
adopt broad plans to reduce  dependence  on the automobile.  Strategies
might include  "old car"  taxes or increased gasoline  taxes.121
Increased  gasoline  taxes  are  an  especially  promising  strategy  be-
cause they would promote energy conservation  and independence  while
effectively combatting pollution.  The gasoline tax in the United States is
currently the lowest of any industrialized  nation; it should be raised to
ensure that gasoline users internalize the environmental costs of their ac-
117.  See generally Ackerman  & Stewart, supra note 86.
118.  For example, pest control strategies  involving biological techniques have proved  quite suc-
cessful,  and inexpensive in the long run  as well.  See  B. COMMONER, supra note 99, at 97-98.
119.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7521  (1988).
120.  See R. CRANDALL,  H. GRUENSPECHT,  T. KEELER  & L.  LAVE, supra note 74, at  89-91
(regulation of emission control by performance standards for new sources are ineffective,  resulting in
increased  demand for older vehicles and enforcement problems, because industries find the program
easy to subvert given  the infrequency  of enforcement audits).
121.  See Postel & Flavin, Reshaping the Global Economy, in THE STATE  OF THE WORLD  1991
at  171,  181-88 (L. Brown ed.  1991) (advocating the institution of"green taxes" and the restructuring
of government  incentives  to reduce  pollution and place  an emphasis on  "sustainable  progress"  as
opposed to maximum economic  growth).
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tivity. 1 2 2  Such an approach would avoid several problems of the prevail-
ing command-and-control  method  of controlling  automobile  pollution,
including inefficiency, a tendency to increase old car retention rates,  and
technological  breakdown by specified  antipollution devices.123
It is not sufficient to respond that gasoline taxes (or any other efforts
that require actors to internalize the social costs of their harmful activity)
would be "regressive,"  in the sense that the poor would feel their effects
more sharply than the well-to-do.  To be sure, any effort to use incentives
is likely  to be harder  on those  with  few  resources  than on  those  with
many.  Indeed,  any  strategy  to  control  many  social  problems  will  in-
crease prices,  and thus hit the poor especially  hard.  For at least three
reasons, however, a system requiring an activity  to reflect its true social
costs should not be deemed illegitimate merely because it has more severe
consequences  for the poor.
First, well-functioning  markets  ensure that the prices  of products
reflect  their  social  costs.  Any  pricing  system,  in  any  market,  works
against  the poor  in the sense that poor people  are  less  able to  pay  for
commodities  than are those with greater resources.  The wealthy will al-
ways  be able to afford the prices set  by the market  for products-from
soap to computers to food-more easily than the poor.  But when society
determines that certain commodities should be available to the poor, and
that the market  prices of those commodities  are too high for some peo-
ple, the sensible  solution  is  to reduce  poverty  or to  grant  government
subsidies to people who are unable to afford those commodities.  It is not
to make ad hoc adjustments  to the pricing system by allowing  govern-
ment to fix prices and thus to keep prices  artificially  low.  Government
price-fixing  will  be inefficient  and will  produce  a  range  of unintended
harmful  consequences,  including  misallocation  of supply  and demand,
leading to scarcity.' 24
When government  refuses to ensure  that products (like energy)  re-
flect their environmental  costs,  the result  is  analytically  the same as  a
government decision to fix prices.  Such a refusal will lower the price of
the resulting  products,  and  some  poor  people  will always  benefit  from
lower  prices.  But  such  a result  is  hardly  a  desirable  approach  to  the
problem of poverty,  any more than an across-the-board,  governmentally
122.  See id. at 182-85.  Determination of the amount of the tax of course poses difficulties.  The
relevant inquiry requires more than purely scientific calculations; it must involve judgments of social
values  as well,  for there is of course no value-free way  to ascertain  the damage done by pollution.
123.  See R. CRANDALL,  H. GRUENSPECHT,  T. KEELER & L. LAVE,  supra note 73, at 89-90.
124.  For example, government price controls contributed to the energy crisis of the early  1970s.
See generally S.  BREYER,  supra note 3,  at 64-68 (arguing that government-imposed  price controls
lead to shortages by keeping prices artificially low and allowing few upward price adjustments as the
seller's costs inevitably  increase over  time).
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mandated  ten  percent reduction  in  the price  of (say)  automobiles  and
soap, which it rather resembles.
Second, the pollution tax is no more regressive than command-and-
control strategies.  Suppose, for example, that government continues to
require expensive,  statutorily specified antipollution devices for new cars.
This  system  also  imposes  costs  that  will  ultimately  be  reflected  in
prices-but  in a  more arbitrary,  less  predictable,  and  less  visible  way
than a direct tax.125  Despite the common assumption that technological
requirements  impose costs on industry and not on consumers,  industry
will usually raise prices and thus pass costs on to consumers.  The view
that regulatory requirements  are directed at companies rather than con-
sumers is thus a highly artificial misunderstanding of regulation, one that
ignores  its real-world effects.
Third, and  finally,  a failure  to require  enterprises  to bear  the full
environmental and social costs of their activities is not a sensible redistri-
bution strategy.  The class of beneficiaries  simply does not correspond to
the category of needy people.  A government subsidy that lowers the cost
of sources of carbon-dioxide  and other greenhouse  gases benefits people
who use those harmful substances.  These beneficiaries are not the people
who can legitimately  claim  government support.  For all these reasons,
the apparently  regressive 126  character  of any  "pollution  tax"  does  not
count as  a reason  against its use.
c.  Deposits.  Deposits might be especially useful in the regulation
of solid and hazardous waste.  The current waste control regulations en-
sure that neither producers nor consumers of waste materials pay dispo-
sal costs;1 27  neither has an incentive to reduce waste.  A deposit system,
however, would make it more expensive to dispose of substances in land-
fills  or in the oceans,  by  requiring  that those  who  handle waste  pay  a
deposit, refundable  in whole  or in part upon a showing of safe  disposal
125.  The costs of command-and-control strategies are more arbitrary because they are less con-
nected with antipollution  goals.  We cannot know whether antipollution technology achieves pollu-
tion benefits  commensurate  with the costs, because the technology will invariably be placed on all
new cars, regardless of the amount of pollution in the relevant area or the consequences for old cars.
126.  Even the term  "regressive  tax" is misleading  in light of the fact that the goal of pollution
taxes is to require that goods reflect their true social costs.  A regulatory system  that accomplishes
this goal should  not be characterized  as a "regressive  tax"  system.
127.  The  Resource  Conservation  and Recovery Act  of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580,  90
Stat. 2795  (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.),  focuses primarily on waste treat-
ment rather  than  waste  minimization.  For an  especially  helpful  discussion  of possible  improve-
ments, see Mennell,  Beyond the Throwaway Society: An Incentive Approach to Regulating  Municipal
Solid  Waste,  17  ECOLOGY  L.Q.  655  (1990)  (arguing  that current  policies  toward  waste  disposal
should be altered to force consumers  and manufacturers  to consider the true social  costs of waste
disposal; possible options include curbside charges based on weight or volume, or a system in which
the purchaser  pays the disposal  costs at the point of sale).
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and recycling.  The government would thus encourage recycling and dis-
courage the accumulation of solid and hazardous  waste.
2.  Market-Based Incentives for Occupational Safety  and Health.
Market-based  incentives should also form the basis for the regulation  of
occupational safety and health.  Congress or OSHA might rely far more
on employers'  actual performance in reducing  deaths and injury and far
less on their compliance with rigid and unrealistic national standards for
workplace design.  A tax on employers for maintaining dangerous condi-
tions,  greater  reliance  on workers'  compensation  and  on  disclosure  of
risks to workers, and more active bargaining and employee involvement
in  the  process  of  monitoring  workplace  safety,  are  all  promising
techniques.
128
Strategies of this general sort can also promote democratic  goals.  A
tax or fine system ensures that someone in a position of public accounta-
bility will decide on appropriate  levels of risk.  Disclosure  strategies al-
low  workers  to learn  about  risks  and  risk  levels,  and  to  take  action
accordingly. 129  In the workplace, such strategies enlist employee support
in reducing occupational risks, and in a highly decentralized manner. 130
This step would greatly improve the current system, which relies  on the
national dictation of risk levels. 131  Nationalized risk decisionmaking pre-
vents employees from becoming involved in the choice among risk levels,
salaries,  and other goals,1 32 and it is particularly  vulnerable to interest-
group  pressures.  Greater  decentralization  would  reduce  these
difficulties.
A system that promotes disclosure of occupational risks also fortifies
the political  processes  at  all  levels  of government.  Disclosure  ensures
128.  See P.  WEILER,  GOVERNING  THE WORKPLACE:  THE FUTURE  OF  LABOR  AND  EMPLOY-
MENT  LAW  191-93  (1990)  (discussing employee  involvement  plans (EIPs) that  are designed  to ad-
dress a number of workers' issues, including job hazards).  These strategies have proven successful in
other countries,  including Sweden.  See S.  KELMAN,  REGULATING AMERICA,  REGULATING  SWE-
DEN:  A COMPARATIVE  STUDY  OF OCCUPATIONAL  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH POLICY 199-203  (1981)
(legislation in the  1970s has given safety stewards greater power to force employers  to comply with
safety regulations; various labor-management  agreements urge management to take an active part in
labor-management  safety committees).
129.  See Emergency Planning and Community  Right-to-Know  Act, 42 U.S.C.  §  11,044  (1988).
See also the discussion  in OFFICE  OF  MANAGEMENT  AND  BUDGET,  REGULATORY  PROGRAM  OF
THE UNITED STATES  GOVERNMENT,  April  1, 1990-March 31,  1991,  26-32 (1991),  and in particular
the analysis of OSHA's hazard  communication standard at 28-29.
130.  See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 3, at 358-60 (advocating a policy that discloses job hazard
information to workers in a "clear and nontechnical"  form, as well as direct regulation of the work-
place by the government).
131.  See 29  U.S.C.  § 655  (1988).
132.  Bargaining should not, however, be allowed to reduce health and safety requirements below
a certain  floor.  See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 3,  at 358-64.
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better-informed  decisions,  enhanced by greater public understanding  of
risk levels and a recognition of the inevitability of choice among compet-
ing and diverse social goods.  In particular, local communities would be
in a better position to decide on the appropriate mix among environmen-
tal, economic, employment,  and other goals.
Disclosure also increases flexibility, participation, and voluntariness
in regulation,  while decreasing informational  pressures on agencies  and
dependence  on government generally.  In this respect, a shift from com-
mand-and-control  to  incentive-based  strategies  holds  out  enormous
promise.
3.  Market-Based Incentives in Other Areas.  These recommenda-
tions apply in areas outside of environmental and occupational safety and
health regulation.  In labor law, for example,  greater encouragement  of
collective bargaining  and worker  organization (though perhaps through
less traditional  forms than ordinary unionization13 3) should replace cen-
tralized national prescriptions.
These recommendations  could also be employed to regulate broad-
casting.  The  considerations  outlined  in  Part  II suggest  reasons to  be
skeptical of unrestricted markets in broadcasting.1 34  In their capacity  as
political participants,  members of the public appear to have aspirational
goals  that conflict  with market  outcomes  in this  area.  The  regulatory
status quo produces a number of problems;  most notably an accelerating
"race  to the bottom"  in terms of the quality of programming.  Television
and radio tend to be excessively influenced by the concerns of advertisers,
rarely deal with serious problems, and are frequently violent, sensational-
istic, prurient,  dehumanizing,  and banal.1 35  Inevitably,  such program-
ming  will have  effects  on the  information,  beliefs,  and  even  desires  of
listeners and viewers.  Indeed, these effects might well be understood as
externalities.  In  these  circumstances,  a  regulatory  response  may  be
justified.
That  response need  not, however,  take  the form  of a  rigid and to
some degree ineffectual  "fairness  doctrine." 136  Instead of imposing  uni-
133.  See generally P. WEILER,  supra note  128,  at  187-224  (1990)  (discussing possible  future
options for worker  participation).
134.  See  Sunstein, supra note  11,  at 28-29; supra text accompanying notes  54-61.
135.  For references,  see Sunstein,  Free Speech Now,  U.  CHI.  L. R'v.  (forthcoming  1992).
136.  That doctrine required attention  to public issues and an opportunity to speak  for opposing
views.  See L. POWE,  AMERICAN  BROADCASTING  AND  THE FIRST AMENDMENT  (1987).  To be
sure, first amendment  questions lurk behind any effort  to regulate  broadcasting.  I do not discuss
those issues  here, although a conception  of the first amendment that would argue  for, rather than
against, regulatory efforts seems entirely plausible.  See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969)  (viewers'  and listeners'  first amendment rights demand that the marketplace of ideas
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form obligations, the licensing agency might award extra "points"  to ap-
plicants who provide  high-quality broadcasting  or who attend  to public
issues-even if those applicants were less competitive in the marketplace.
This type of "point"  strategy would not dictate  outcomes, but it would
create  market-like incentives  to  engage in desirable  behavior.  Alterna-
tively, government could require that ordinary broadcasters give a speci-
fied percentage of their profits either to public broadcasting or to private
companies that are willing to sacrifice some of their advertising  revenues
and audience  to provide higher-quality  fare.  This system would  intro-
duce some of the virtues of environmental emissions trading systems into
broadcasting regulation.
V.  LESSONS  FOR THE JUDICIARY
The suggestions made thus far are principally directed at legislators
and administrators.  As I have indicated, a focus on substance requires a
movement away from the traditional preoccupation with the judiciary to
a focus  on congressional  and bureaucratic  processes.  These remain ill-
understood  despite the fact  that they have  far more important  roles in
government  regulation. 137  Concern  with  regulatory  substance  does,
however,  have consequences  for judicial review  as  well.  Concentration
on regulatory results may require an adjustment in statutory interpreta-
tion and in decisions about which regulatory approaches are "arbitrary"
within the meaning  of the Administrative  Procedure  Act  (APA).138  I
offer a few suggestions here. 139
Statutory interpretation usually involves an ascertainment of mean-
ing  through  an  examination  of the  statutory  text,  structure,  and  his-
tory. 14°  When the meaning of a statute is otherwise clear,  courts should
not rely on any  substantive  ideas  about the regulatory state  to subvert
that meaning.  Statutory meaning is, however, a function of interpretive
principles,  without  which text  and  history are  unintelligible.  Some  of
these principles are simply parts of language, some can be traced to con-
stitutional norms;  and  others  are  a product  of judicial  understandings
about institutional concerns.
In  easy  cases, interpretive principles  are so widely  shared  as to be
invisible.  For example,  the Clean  Air Act does  not preempt state  tort
be protected from monopolization,  whether by government or by private licensee);  L. BOLLINGER,
IMAGES  OF A FREE PRESS  (1991);  Sunstein, supra note  135.
137.  See supra notes  1-13  and accompanying  text.
138.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)  (1988).
139.  For an more elaborate discussion,  see C. SuNsr  IN, supra note *, at  111-92.
140.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural  Resources Defense Council, Inc.,  467 U.S. 832 (1984)
(examining these sources).
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law-not  because  of  any  language  in  the  text  itself, but  because  of
agreed-upon  conventions  about the limited preemptive  effect of federal
statutes. 141  In more difficult  cases,  however,  interpretive principles are
mentioned explicitly.  Thus, for example, courts use canons of construc-
tion to construe statutes  so as  to avoid constitutional  doubts,142 and to
favor Indian tribes. 1 43  These and many other principles give meaning to
statutory silences  and help resolve  cases otherwise in equipoise.
Interpretive  principles  are not static.  They change over time, with
new  understandings  about which principles  are  better adapted  to con-
temporary  government.  An understanding of regulatory aspiration  and
failure could well form the basis of new principles of statutory interpreta-
tion.  Indeed, such understandings play a large role in existing doctrine,
whether explicitly or implicitly.144  Courts might ultimately develop a set
of principles  attuned to the often-salutary  goals of regulatory programs
and to the ways that these programs  break down in practice.
For example,  courts might be encouraged  to take into account the
sometimes counterintuitive systemic effects of government regulation. 145
The consequences of different strategies  are often relevant both to statu-
tory meaning  and to the question of "arbitrariness"  within the meaning
of the APA.  In addition, courts might better understand the paradoxes
of the regulatory  state,  and  consider,  for example,  the possibility  that
regulating new risks can perpetuate old risks, that especially severe regu-
141.  See  e.g.,  Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S.  581,  587-88 (1989)  (in areas of traditional state law
preeminence,  such as domestic relations,  a federal law will not be read  so as to preempt state  law
unless  preemption  is "positively required");  Puerto  Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v.  Isla Petro-
leum  Corp., 485  U.S.  495,  499-501  (1988)  (the Court looks  for a "clear  and manifest"  purpose by
Congress to supersede existing state law, before preemption by a federal statute is allowed); Hillsbor-
ough County v. Automated Medical  Laboratories, 471  U.S.  707,  715-16 (1985)  (where local health
and safety regulations  are concerned, there is a presumption  that the local regulations  coexist with
similar federal  regulations).
142.  See, eg.,  NLRB v. Catholic  Bishop,  440 U.S.  490, 507  (1979)  (refusing to construe Na-
tional  Labor Relations  Act to require  resolution of difficult  cases under first  amendment  religion
clauses); Kent v. Dulles, 357  U.S.  116,  129  (1958)  (narrowly construing the broad power delegated
to  the Secretary  of State  to issue  passports because the right  of a citizen to  travel abroad  is an
important liberty and cannot be deprived without due process of law).
143.  See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471  U.S.  759,  764-66  (1985)  (Indian tribes oc-
cupy a unique position in the United States because of the tribes' continued  sovereignty; as a corol-
lary of this,  the Court will construe  ambiguous  statutes in their  favor); Three  Affiliated  Tribes v.
Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S.  138,  149 (1984) (when interpreting statutes that benefit the Indian tribes, it is
a settled rule that any doubts should be construed in favor of the Indians).
144.  See C. SUNSTEIN,  supra note *, at 111-59 (attacking many accepted principles of statutory
construction and proposing an alternative approach to statutory interpretation); Sunstein, supra note
80, at 434-40  (discussing how judges often look at the consequences of their decisions,  even if not
expressly  called  upon to do so by the statute in question).
145.  See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,  329-32  (D.C. Cir. 1981)  (discussing congressional
desire that regulatory standards not worsen existing problems in upholding EPA's authority to ana-
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lation can produce underregulation, and that requirements of best avail-
able  technology  can  retard  technological  development.146  These
paradoxes bear on a number of issues in litigation. 147
Other principles might be derived from considerations of regulatory
goals and failures.  To allow de minimis exemptions  from regulatory  re-
quirements would do much more good than harm.14  The failure to per-
mit  such  exemptions  may  cause  inefficiency  and  produce  risks,  not
benefits, to health and safety.  In most cases, courts should assume that
Congress wants at least some form of balancing of the various  effects of
regulatory statutes.1 49  Statutes that forbid balancing are usually under-
enforced  or  have  unanticipated,  but  serious,  adverse  consequences.
Courts  should  also construe statutes  generously  on behalf of disadvan-
taged groups, which, by definition, face systematic obstacles in the imple-
mentation process.1 50
To  say this  is not to  say  that such  interpretive  principles  should
overcome  unambiguous  statutory text and history.  But a better under-
standing of regulatory substance will inevitably affect the practice ofjudi-
cial review in difficult cases.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The  basic  commitments  of contemporary  administrative  law  find
their source  in the liberal republicanism of the founding generation  and
146.  See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying  text.
147.  See International  Union v. OSHA,  938 F.2d  1310,  1326-27 (D.C. Cir.  1991)  (Williams, J.
concurring);  Sunstein, supra note 77, at 413-29.
148.  See C. SUNSTEIN,  supra note *, at  198-99.  For cases to this effect,  see  Bowen v. Yuckert,
482 U.S.  137 (1987)  (finding that legislation that required consideration of all impairments in deter-
mining whether Social  Security disability applicant could be  eligible for benefits  supported regula-
tions that denied  consideration of such impairments when assessing severity of disability);  Alabama
Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323,  356-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (EPA may allow exemptions from clear
statutory regulatory language  for reasons of administrative necessity or where the resulting harm  is
de minimis); Monsanto  Co. v. Kennedy, 613  F.2d 947,  955-56 (D.C. Cir.  1979) (under the federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA has the power to label any substance  as a "food additive"
if even minute amounts of the substance enter a food; in  practice, however, the FDA can find  such
additive amounts  "insignificant"  and not worthy of FDA regulation).
149.  See Industrial  Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 644-
52  (1980)  (striking down an occupational health and safety standard promulgated  by the Secretary
of Labor because the Secretary did not make a threshold finding that a significant  risk to workers
existed);  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc. v. Thomas,  824 F.2d  1146,  1152-54  (D.C. Cir.
1987) (congressional  silence on the definition of "ample margin  of safety"  does not require that  the
EPA set  a zero  level  of emissions  for  certain pollutants  for which  the  EPA cannot  determine  a
harmless level of emission).
150.  See Sunstein, Interpreting  Statutes in the Regulatory  State, 103 HARV.  L. REV. 407, 483-85
(1989)  (arguing that  disadvantaged  groups should  receive  the  benefit of the  doubt  when  a court
interprets a regulatory  statute because  these groups  face special difficulties  in bringing an  enforce-
ment action).ADMINISTRATIVE  SUBSTANCE
in New Deal understandings  of the twentieth-century  state.  Those com-
mitments  call for an extensive  regulatory  apparatus,  one that attempts
simultaneously to promote economic prosperity and to protect the disad-
vantaged.  The  foundations  of modem  regulation  are  self-consciously
pragmatic.  When current strategies have failed, they should be changed.
Existing approaches  that do not address serious  problems, or that pro-
duce problems of their own, should be replaced by new ones.
I have sought to provide  some illustrations of the enormous oppor-
tunities we now have with which to accomplish the goals of social regula-
tion  without  returning  to  discredited  laissez-faire  principles  or
perpetuating  the  rigidities  and  paradoxes of current  programs.  Above
all, regulatory reform should be attuned to the incentive effects of regula-
tory initiatives.  Having  rejected  markets,  regulatory  programs  should
nonetheless  take  advantage  of market  forces  where  these  can  be  har-
nessed  to promote  regulatory  goals.  For the most part, economic  and
democratic goals can work together.  Efforts to increase information, to
promote  disclosure,  to produce  greater  decentralization,  and  to  shift
from  command-and-control  to incentive-based  systems  promise  to  de-
crease regulatory costs and increase regulatory  benefits while simultane-
ously bringing about dramatic improvements in the democratic process.
To this extent, the prescriptions for increasing the efficiency of regulatory
programs will also serve the end  of increased  democratization.1 51
In evaluating reforms, little is to be gained by generalities that point
to the  frequent problems  in  either government  regulation  or in private
markets.  Even the question whether  there should  be "more"  or  "less"
regulation  tends  to  confuse,  rather  than clarify,  matters.152  Questions
about the existence and extent of current problems are too dependent on
context to allow for global prescriptions.  It is far more helpful to rely on
particularized  understandings  of how markets  and regulation  are likely
to break down-to learn, in short, from the past.  Ultimately, the propos-
als suggested here would create a system unembarrassed  to use govern-
ment  to  promote  democratic  aspirations  and  economic  welfare,  but
insistent  on strategies  that embody the flexibility,  adaptability, produc-
tive potential, and decentralization  characteristic  of private markets.
More  generally,  the next  generation  of administrative  law  should
witness  a  large-scale  shift from judicially  policed administrative  proce-
dure to regulatory programs designed by legislators and bureaucrats.  To
be sure, the legal culture has only begun to explore the real-world conse-
151.  I  do  not,  of course,  suggest  that  the  goals  of  efficiency  and  democracy  are  always
incompatible.
152.  See Howse, Prichard & Trebilcock, supra note  84, at 506-09 (claiming that question  is not
one of size).
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quences of regulatory programs, the values and commitments that do or
should underlie those programs, and alternative mechanisms to promote
the  goals of regulation  while minimizing  the risk  of regulatory  failure.
But it might not be too utopian to hope that by its fiftieth anniversary  in
1996, we might be able to start on the path of accompanying the largely
successful APA 153 with another generic statute-one that holds out even
more promise, and one that attends to the problem of administrative sub-
stance rather than the control of administrative discretion. 154
153.  5  U.S.C.  §§ 551-559,  701-706 (1988).
154.  A large advantage of a generic statute is that it diminishes the power of interest groups over
particular  areas.  Two Executive Orders, Exec. Ord.  12,291,  3  C.F.R. §  127  (1981),  reprinted  in 5
U.S.C. § 601 note (1988),  and Exec. Ord. 12,498,  3 C.F.R. § 323  (1985), reprinted  in 5  U.S.C. § 601
note  (1988),  which  set  forth  substantive  principles  of cost-benefit  analysis  and  cost-effectiveness,
might be seen as forerunners  of this sort of approach.  In addition, the implementing  guidelines  of
the Office of Management  and Budget, along with the coordination  of authority within that agency,
are steps in the right direction.  See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT  AND  BUDGET, REGULATORY  PRO-
GRAM  OF  THE UNITED  STATES  GOVERNMENT,  April  1, 1990-March  31,  1991  (1991).  The guide-
lines  have  usefully  counteracted  problems  of overregulation,  lack of accountability,  and  lack  of
coordination.  They also make some progress in dealing with the related problems of poor incentives
and  inefficiency.  One  remaining difficulty,  however,  is that the  guidelines do  not respond  to  the
important problem  of failure  to regulate.
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